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I.  Introduction 
We consider the question in this paper of the transition from regulated monopoly 
to competitive local markets in telecommunications.  Technological change in terms of 
cellular/mobile competition has arisen over the past 20 years where in most industrialized 
countries more than 80% of the population has cellular service.  Even more importantly 
the spread of competing fiber networks operated by cable companies that offer voice 
service and broadband service, in addition to pay TV, has transformed the competitive 
environment in the US and has the potential to do so in many other countries.  This 
transition will need to be managed within the framework of mandatory unbundling, first 
adopted in the US in the mid-1990s, and now used by regulators in most advanced 
economies.  We discuss the expected endpoint of competitive local markets, which 
should be facilities based competition.  We also discuss whether regulators will allow this 
process to occur or will hinder the process and end up with “regulation forever” by 
creating incentives for new entrants to choose mandatory unbundling offer rather than 
investing in their own competing facilities.
2  The US is well positioned to greatly 
decrease regulation with “End in Sight” while the EU countries and other nations such as 
Australia may well be on the path to “Regulation Forever.”  Indeed a number of US states 
and Canada have recently deregulated fixed line telephone services as we discuss in this 
paper. 
Economic advice to regulators regarding the correct principles to set regulated 
prices has often been incorrect in that it ignored the technology of the industry. 
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Economists recognized early on that in the situation of privately owned utilities in the 
United States that the first-best prescription of price set equal to marginal cost could not 
be used because of the substantial fixed (and common) costs that most regulated utilities 
needed to pay for.
3  This realization typically accompanied the claim that the economies 
of scale of the regulated firm were so significant that competition could not take place 
because the regulated firm’s cost function was significantly below new entrants. 
Nevertheless, the most common advice from economists was that prices should be set 
similar to the outcome of a competitive process.  Regulatory agencies largely adopted this 
technology worldwide.  For example, the U.S. Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) when establishing the regulatory framework for setting prices under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 had the goal of to adopt a pricing methodology that 
“best replicates, to the extent possible, the conditions in a competitive market.”
4  Similar 
statement about using a pricing framework to replicate competition have been made by 
numerous regulatory agencies.  Indeed, the adoption of the TELRIC model by the FCC 
and similar TSLRIC models by regulators elsewhere were supposed to achieve prices 
similar to outcomes in a “competitive market.”
5 
What the competitive process would be was never specified with any detail, 
which was to be expected since economic theory had no well-accepted model of 
competition with a technology exhibiting strong economies of scale, especially in the 
multiproduct situation.  In the United States, regulators following legal principles adopted 
the position that the regulated firm should cover its costs.
6 However, regulators also 
adopted prices for certain services to attempt to meet social goals for these given 
services.  For other services, regulators used arbitrary means to set prices while balancing 
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competing claims from increasingly well organized groups of consumers, all of whom 
claimed they should receive low prices with other groups paying for the fixed and 
common costs. 
This regulatory approach arguably did not do undue damage when no actual 
competition existed.  So long as the regulated firm was (nearly) productively efficient, 
the losses were essentially second-order social welfare losses.  The regulated firm 
covered its total costs, at least approximately, although prices for individual services were 
often badly distorted from an economically efficient solution.   
The regulatory process often failed to take sufficient notice of the importance of 
new product and service innovation in telecommunications.  Academic research has 
found that much of the gains in consumer welfare occur when new services are 
introduced. The regulatory approach, by retarding the introduction of new 
telecommunications services harmed consumers to a significant degree by retarding new 
product innovation, which is a first-order loss to economic efficiency.  See Hausman 
(1997) for estimates of consumer welfare loss.  Telecommunications differs in an 
important respect from many other regulated industries because of the rapidity of 
technological change.  Telecommunications regulators have found it difficult to adapt to 
these changes and outdated regulatory policies may create perverse economic incentives 
for investments in new technology as we discuss subsequently.
7 
However, when actual competition appeared and was allowed to exist by the 
regulators, the economists’ advice of setting prices as if they were the outcome of a 
competitive process soon led to a regulatory morass.  Regulators could no longer depend 
only on cost factors in setting regulated prices.  The outcome of a competitive process 
would also need to take into account demand factors and competitive interaction 
(oligopoly) factors, with the first set of factors difficult to measure and the competitive 
interaction factors unlikely to be agreed upon.  While regulators had some imperfect 
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information about costs, they typically had little or no information about demand and no 
well-developed idea regarding the effects of competitive factors.      
A particularly difficult problem arose when a regulated firm wanted to decrease 
its prices for services subject to entrant competition.  Economists recognized that price 
set above incremental (marginal) cost should be permitted.  New entrants wanted the 
previously set regulator set prices to be maintained.  New entrants typically entered 
because regulated prices were well above efficient levels, and the new entrants did not 
want these prices decreased.  Furthermore, from a social welfare viewpoint the argument 
became first-order since inefficient new firms could be productively inefficient, causing a 
first-order loss of social welfare. 
Regulators found it difficult to permit the regulated firm to decrease its prices, 
especially since under cost of service regulation other prices would need to increase.  
Even when cost of service regulation was replaced by incentive (price-cap) regulation in 
the 1980s and 1990s, regulators still found it extremely difficult to allow price decreases 
since they believed in “regulated competition” (an oxymoron) where the regulators could 
better manage competition than the market.
8 Nevertheless, the regulated companies were 
not harmed too badly since competition did not proceed at such a rapid pace to cause 
extreme economic damage. 
  Cost-based regulation of telecommunications (for example rate-of-return 
regulation in the United States) had significant negative effects on innovation while it 
was claimed that it led to excessive capital investment.  Most economists conclude that 
cost-based regulation led to significant consumer harm. In the mid-1980s when the U.K. 
government privatized British Telecom (BT), it decided not to use the historic approach 
of cost of service regulation to set regulated prices as the United States and Canada had 
done.  The U.K. government instead chose price caps, a new regulatory method proposed 
by Littlechild.
9  Price caps regulated prices based on inflation and a productivity factor 
instead of regulated profits as in the U.S. cost of service based “rate of return” (ROR) 
regulation.   
                                                 
8 See the chapter by P. Joskow in this volume that discusses the theory and application of 
using incentive based regulation to replace traditional cost of service regulation.   5
Price caps had a number of advantages over ROR regulation in terms of 
incentives for cost minimization (productive efficiency), innovation, and the ability of the 
regulated firm to rebalance its prices.  In particular, the regulated firm could decrease its 
prices to compete.  In 1989-90 the Federal Communications Commission adopted price 
caps in the United States.  Other countries such as Australia had also adopted price caps. 
During the 1980s and 1990s price cap regulation was implemented instead of cost-based 
regulation in most countries when telephone companies and other utilities were 
privatized.  In the majority of the states of the United States, rate-of-return regulation has 
been replaced by price cap regulation.   The battle to banish cost-based regulation 
appeared to be largely over.
10 
  During the late 1990s and the early 2000s cost-based regulation has reappeared 
because of the necessity to set price for unbundled network elements (UNEs) sold by 
incumbent firms to their competitors. A number of countries—including the United 
States, Australia, and Canada—adopted mandatory network unbundling for the 
incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC). The most commonly used approach to set 
regulated network element prices based on costs is “total service long run incremental 
cost”, or TSLRIC although the US adopted TELRIC instead of TSLRIC.
11   
Unfortunately, the adoption of TSLRIC as a cost basis to set the prices for unbundled 
elements has negative economic incentive effects for innovation and for new investment 
in telecommunications networks as we have discussed in previous academic research. 
(Hausman 1997, 1998, 2003; Hausman & Sidak 1999)  Indeed, in the U.S. the two major 
landline telephone companies Verizon and AT&T (previously Southwestern Bell) began 
construction of residential fiber optic networks soon after the FCC exempted new 
network investment from regulation in 2003 and began service in 2005.  To the contrary, 
the incumbent residential telephone provider in Australia, Telstra, has so far refused to 
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proceed with construction of a residential fiber optic network until it receives a guarantee 
from it regulatory regarding future regulatory policy towards new network construction.   
  How did network unbundling and a return to cost-based regulation become 
government policy?  In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 
1996.  As a tradeoff for being permitted to offer long distance service, the incumbent Bell 
operating companies agreed to unbundle their networks.
12  The FCC adopted cost of 
service regulation to set the unbundled network element prices.  Thus reappeared the 
well-known problems of cost of service regulation, with its inability to correctly treat 
economies of scale and economies of scope and its use of arbitrary allocations of fixed 
and common costs to prices.  Even worse, the FCC adopted the approach of “total 
element long run incremental cost” (TELRIC), which assumes that all investments in 
telecommunications networks are fixed, but not sunk.  This assumption is, of course, 
directly contradicted by the actual technology of telecommunications networks. Other 
countries have adopted a similar approach based on total service long run incremental 
costs (TSLRIC).  Similar problems arise.  While both TELRIC and TSLRIC regulation 
were supposed to be “forward looking” so capital investments are not yet sunk, since 
network are very long-lived investment their sunk characteristic becomes very important 
in a world of uncertainty.
13  Regulator gave new entrants a “free option” to purchase 
either the unbundled element (TELRIC) or service (TSLRIC) on a monthly basis, which 
treated the investment as fixed but not sunk. 
  In this paper we do not review these problems, which have been discussed in 
previous papers (e.g. Hausman 1997, 2003 and Pindyck 2004) but instead we consider 
the outcomes so far of the new regulatory approach to unbundling the incumbents’ 
networks.  We concentrate on the outcome in three countries: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and New Zealand.  The United States first adopted unbundling and has 
taken the most aggressive approach.  However, in February 2005 the FCC, acting in 
response to a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacating the 
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agency’s unbundling rules, decided to “sunset” its most intrusive form of unbundling.
14  
In response, the two most prominent local competitors, AT&T and MCI, announced they 
would exit the local market. Shortly thereafter, both companies announced that they 
would be acquired by incumbent local exchange operators, known as ILECs, (SBC and 
Verizon).  Thus, while much of the “competition” caused by the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 was “artificial competition” (to borrow Justice Breyer’s characterization), the 
local market in the United States will benefit from facilities-based competition as cable 
television networks rapidly expand their offering of telephone service over their networks 
through voice over internet protocol (VOIP). 
  In the United Kingdom, the regulator initially favored facilities-based competition 
from the U.K.’s cable operators, which already had a substantial share of the local 
telephone market.  However, the regulator subsequently changed direction, in part 
because of directions from the EU. We examine the effect of unbundling in the United 
Kingdom and its effect on the prospects for future facilities-based competition. Those 
prospects are all the most doubtful after the regulator (now, OFCOM) and BT announced 
in May 2005 that they had reached a compromise—in lieu of structural separation—that 
appears to “renationalize” BT insofar as governance of network unbundling is concerned. 
  Lastly, we consider New Zealand, where the regulator decided not to adopt 
network unbundling.   New Zealand has an explicit consumer welfare test for regulation, 
the “long term benefit of end-users”, and bases regulatory decisions, in part, on an 
explicit cost-benefit analysis. Further, when the decision was made in New Zealand not 
to unbundle, the United States had over six years of experience of unbundling.  We 
explore how this experience affected the regulator’s decision in New Zealand. 
  Our general conclusion is that in both the United States and the United Kingdom 
unbundling may have caused an increase in competition, if one measures competition by 
market share of entrants.  However, adverse effects occurred in terms of investments by 
both incumbents and new entrants.  Further, the “goals” put forward by regulators in 
terms of unbundling have not been met. 
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  In the last section we consider whether, with increased facilities-based 
competition, especially in the United States, the “end of regulation” in 
telecommunications can occur.  We explain that in an industry with high fixed costs and 
low variable costs, the incumbent will not be able to increase prices above competitive 
levels profitably if it loses a relatively small amount of business. Thus, the entry of cable 
television providers offering telephone service will serve to constrain incumbents from 
increasing prices above competitive levels at a quite early stage.  Further, cellular 
telephone will also offer a further constraining force.  Thus, no economic reason exists 
for the incumbent’s share to fall to, say, 50% before price deregulation can follow.  
Emerging facilities-based competition can allow the end of price regulation and the 
regulatory burden that it creates for both consumers and the economy. 
  
 II.  The Simple Model of Cost-based Regulation 
The typical approach to cost-based regulation is to use costs of production to set 
prices that would be the result of a “competitive” situation.
15  These costs of production 
are used to set prices independent of demand factors.  A very simple one good-one period 
Marshallian partial equilibrium model leads to the result, where competitive prices are 
independent of demand.  We first describe this simple model and its inherent limitations. 
 
A.  Conditions for Prices Independent of Demand 
  Assume that a given regulated telecommunications service is produced by one or 
more input factors.  No multi-period capital goods are present.  The production 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale.  In Figure 1 the result follows that the 
competitive price equal marginal cost, which in turns equals average cost, because of the 
assumption of constant returns to scale.  As can be seen, the position and shape of the 
demand curve does not matter in setting the competitive price.  Under these conditions, 
cost determines price, independent of demand.  This interesting result depends very much 
on the assumptions of the economic model: partial equilibrium, so that demand for the 
product does not affect input factor prices; constant returns to scale, so there are no 
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economies of scale; a single product, so there is no joint production and no economies of 
scope; and a single period, so there are no durable capital goods.  We discuss later what 
happens when these assumptions do not hold.  If any of the assumptions fails, the 
competitive price cannot be based on cost, independent of demand.  Thus, the price-
independent-of-demand result will turn out to be a very special result not applicable to 
the real world of telecommunications. 
 
B.  The Role of Fixed Costs and Economies of Scale 
  We will now generalize this model slightly.  Suppose that marginal cost remain 
constant but that we allow for a fixed cost of production.  However, a single service is 
still being produced.  The cost function can be written as: 
 
  wq F w q C   ) , (        (2.1) 
 
where F is the fixed cost, q is output quantity, and w is the constant marginal cost per unit 
of output.  A regulator might conclude that in a competitive, free entry situation price 
would equal average cost, so that  . ) / ( ) / ( w q F q C p      Since quantity demanded is a 
function of price, price is no longer independent of demand.  However, setting price 
equal to average cost, ATC, seems to be the correct outcome if the regulated utility is to 
recover its costs. 
 
  C.  The Role of Common Costs and Economies of Scope 
  Now we consider common costs.  A common cost arises when two (or more) 
services arise from a joint production process, but some of the cost is incremental to 
neither product.  The term “fixed and common costs” arises often in discussion of 
regulated costs and prices because of the common occurrence of this type of cost.  In 
terms of the cost function we will again assume constant marginal costs for each output: 
 
  2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 ) , ; , ( q w q w G w w q q C          (2.2) 
   10
Note that in equation (2.2) the fixed cost G cannot be uniquely assigned to either output.  
Indeed, no measure of average costs for either output exists. Thus the statement, 
sometimes made, that regulators set prices equal to average cost is incorrect because no 
measure of “average cost” exists when a joint production process occurs.
16  Here 
regulators typically choose to use an allocation of the fixed cost G to each service.  
However, these allocations such as “fully allocated cost,” “equal allocation of cost,” and 
so on are inherently arbitrary.
17  Nevertheless, the results of the allocations have very 
important consequences on the regulated prices.  These regulated prices in turn have 
important effects on competition, economic efficiency, and consumer welfare.   
In competitive markets, firms set price based on cost conditions, demand 
conditions, and competitive conditions.  Regulators attempt to base prices on only the 
first of these three factors. While the level of demand is used so that that price times 
demand, across all service, is supposed to equal the cost of the regulated company, 
demand elasticities are almost never used.  Yet in competitive markets demand 
elasticities are an important component of pricing decisions in a multi-product situation.   
Thus, regulators do not meet their goal of setting regulated prices in a manner similar to 
that of a competitive market.  Furthermore, they can cause billions of dollars per year of 
losses in economic efficiency and consumer welfare.
18  Instead of using inherently 
arbitrary allocation procedures, regulators could improve the outcome of the regulatory 
process either by taking account of demand and competitive conditions in setting 
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between the customer premise and the central office should be recovered.  Should local 
service pay for it or should it be paid for by some combination of local service, long 
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17 Indeed, the results of the allocations can depend in important ways on the units in 
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Regulation," Tax Policy and the Economy, 12, 1998 and J. Hausman and H. Shelanski,   11
regulated prices or adopting procedures such as global price caps, which will lead the 
regulated utility to take account of demand and competitive conditions.
19 
 
D.  The Role of Sunk Costs 
  We now generalize the model one step more by considering sunk costs in addition 
to fixed costs.  Sunk costs are costs that cannot be recovered if the economic activity 
ceases.  Sunk costs are prevalent in telecommunications networks. Consider an 
investment in a (copper) loop to a residential customer.  The customer has a unique loop 
that connects the residence to the central office switch.  If the customer decides to use a 
competitive service, such as local access service offered by a competitive cable company 
or by a wireless company for its voice (and broadband) service, the copper loop cannot be 
redeployed in another service.  The investment in the loop is sunk.  Now if a regulated 
telephone company faced no uncertainty over the future use of the loop and the cost and 
prices for the associated services provided with the loop, the distinction between a fixed 
cost, which arises from an asset which can be economically redeployed, and a sunk cost 
is not that important.   
Indeed, in the “old days” of cost-based regulation for a monopoly provider, if an 
investment were deemed to be “used and useful” by the regulator, then the asset entered 
the regulatory cost base.  Once the asset entered the regulatory cost base, the regulator, in 
principle, allowed the utility to recover the cost of the investment.
20 
  However, in the current situation of competition, where the utility’s competitors 
are allowed to use the incumbent’s network at regulated prices, the distinction between 
fixed costs and sunk costs can be important.  The competitor typically pays for the 
facility it uses on a monthly basis.  As we explain below, regulators universally use an 
approach that assumes that the investment costs are fixed but not sunk.  In setting the 
regulated prices without taking into account the interaction of sunk costs and uncertainty, 
                                                                                                                                                 
“Economic Welfare and Telecommunications Welfare: The E-Rate Policy for Universal 
Service Subsidies,” Yale Journal on Regulation , 1999  
19 See Laffont and Tirole (2000) for a discussion of global price caps.  See P. Joskow’s 
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regulators give competitors a “free option” to use the incumbent’s network without 
requiring a price that takes account of the sunk cost nature of much of the investment.  
The regulators thus subsidize the competitors at the expense of the incumbent and create 
an economic disincentive for the competitors to invest in their own competing facilities.
21  
Furthermore, the regulators decrease the incentive for new services offered by the 
incumbent.  New services often fail.  Yet if successful new services must be resold to 
competitors at cost, the incentive to undertake the required risky investment is 
decreased.
22  Thus, regulators are likely to decrease new services for consumers based on 
their approach to setting regulated prices. 
 
III.  Cost-Based Regulation: Economic Analysis with Cost But Not Demand  
  The FCC and other regulators claimed to be using a competitive model for setting 
regulated prices, at least for TELRIC and TSLRIC as we stated above.
23  The FCC stated 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 In practice, because of the interaction of incorrect depreciation schedules and inflation, 
utilities often did not recover the true cost of their investments.  See e.g. Schmalensee 
(1989). 
21 Regulation permits a new entrant to choose to use the new investment if it is 
successful, thus truncating the potential return of the incumbent who has make a risky 
investment in sunk costs.  However, the new entrant needs to make no investment in the 
new project so it does not face the risk of the incumbent and thus it receives a “free 
option.”   See Figure 2, which demonstrates the effect of the free option is to decrease the 
expected return of a new investment because of truncation of the returns distribution.  
Justice Stephen Breyer of the U.S. Supreme Court AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 
119 S. Ct. 721 (1999), recognized how this outcome distorts and decreases the actual 
amount of competition.  It is sometime claimed incorrectly that the firm’s cost of 
financial capital will increase to offset the increase in risk.  This claim fails to recognize 
that a typical telecommunications firm produces many products and services, e.g. 
cellular, which are not price regulated.  Indeed, the FCC has recognized that the cost of 
capital used in setting unbundled element rates may differ from the firm’s overall cost of 
capital.  See Order on Remand, In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 2005 FCC 
LEXIS 912, WC Docket No. 04-313, CC Dkt. No. 01-338 (FCC Feb. 4, 2005). 
22 For estimates of the extremely large gain to consumer welfare that can arise from new 
telecommunications services see J. Hausman, "Valuation and the Effect of  Regulation on 
New Services in Telecommunications," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:  
Microeconomics, 1997. 
23 Federal Communications Commission, Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, First Report 
and Order, August 8, 1996, ¶ 679. 
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it goal is to establish a framework that “best replicates, to the extent possible, the 
conditions in a competitive market.”  As we discussed above, in a simple one-period and 
one-good production model with constant returns to scale, a partial equilibrium 
Marshallian analysis demonstrates that the competitive price does not depend on demand.  
Marginal cost and average cost are independent of quantity produced, so the position of 
the demand curve does not affect the price as demonstrated in Figure 1.  However, the 
required description of technology does not describe accurately almost any industry in a 
modern industrial economy and certainly not the telecommunications industry.  For 
example, telephone and wireless networks have a very large proportion of fixed and sunk 
costs.  We now consider whether the “price independent of demand” result holds in a 
broader context to see whether it is (approximately) applicable to telecommunications. 
  To do so we consider “non-substitution” theorems, which demonstrate that under 
certain conditions an economy will have a unique price structure determined by the costs 
of production, independent of the structure of final demand.  We will refer to these results 
as Samuelson-Mirrlees non-substitution theorems.
24  We consider initially the simplest 
situation where labor is the only non-produced factor in the economy.  Here a set of 
necessary conditions that would lead to a Samuelson-Mirrlees non-substitution theorem 
result: 
 
  Necessary Conditions for a non-substitution theorem: 
1.  Only one non-produced good exists: the good is usually assumed to be 
labor so that land or minerals do not exist. 
2. The technology is constant returns to scale: a constant per unit 
requirement of inputs occurs regardless of the amount of output.  This 
condition rules out economies of scale.   
3.  No joint production: a single production process cannot lead to two or 
more different outputs.  This condition rules out economies of scope.   
4.  The economy is productive: the economy can produce a positive net 
vector of outputs where net output is gross output minus inputs. 
   14
With these (plus some additional technical) conditions, the product prices will be 
independent of final demand.  The product prices will equal the cost of production, 
denominated in terms of the numeraire, which can be units of the non-produced good.  
Thus, in a Samuelson-Mirrlees non-substitution model, prices of the many products in the 
economy are independent of demand, as in the simple partial equilibrium single-product 
Marshallian model 
 
  B.  Necessary Assumptions and Economic Reality: The “Regulatory Fallacy” 
  We now consider how realistic the necessary assumptions for the application of 
the non-substitution theorem are in the context of telecommunications.  Could the 
regulatory goal of setting competitive prices independent of demand hold approximately 
true in a realistic economic situation?  Since the assumption for the Samuelson-Mirrlees 
non-substitution theorems are necessary assumptions, no weaker assumptions will do.  
Thus, to correctly set prices independent of demand, the four necessary assumptions must 
hold true.  The first assumption of only a single unproduced factor cannot be correct in a 
modern economy.  If labor and land (minerals) are both unproduced factors, their relative 
prices will affect input costs and final product prices.  But their relative prices will 
depend on the pattern of demand for products that use both labor and land (silicon, 
copper, and silver).  Since products will use in direct and indirect form different 
proportions of the non-produced products, the relative prices cannot be independent of 
demand.  Then, neither the cost of production nor final product prices can be independent 
of demand.  How important this departure from the necessary assumption is cannot be 
resolved easily.  It may not be that important since, if we consider telecommunications as 
a separable sector of the economy (somewhat similar to partial equilibrium analysis), it 
might be claimed that the sector is small enough compared to a given regional economy 
for service and the world economy for capital goods, that is does not have a significant 
effect on the relative prices of the primary factors.  The price of the Hicksian composite 
economy for the non-telecommunications sector might then be used as a numeraire 
without too much departure from reality.  We will similarly dispose of the last 
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assumption that the economy is productive with the remark that as an approximation 
likely departure (if any) would likely be unimportant. 
  We now turn to the two most important necessary assumptions for the current 
application: no economies of scale and no economies of scope.  The presence of large 
economies of scale has traditionally been given as one of the primary reasons for 
regulation.
25  The old question of a “natural monopoly” is based on large economies of 
scale.  Whether or not the claim of a natural monopoly is correct, modern 
telecommunications network regulation in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, 
and Canada is based on the importance of economies of scale.
26  The idea is that a new 
entrant cannot duplicate the telecommunications network, so that the incumbent provider 
is required to sell the use of its network to the new entrant at a regulated cost.  The 
common terminology of “fixed and common” costs in telecommunications denotes the 
importance of economies of scale that arise from the “fixed costs” in modern 
telecommunications networks.  As we discuss later, the regulated price typically ignores 
demand factors, which is inconsistent with the whole notion of economies of scale.  The 
higher is demand, the lower is per unit cost, especially when fixed costs are taken into 
account. 
  The “no economies of scope” assumption of the Samuelson-Mirrlees non-
substitution theorems is violated by all modern telecommunications networks.  
Economies of scope arise when it is less costly to produce two or more products jointly 
than by separate production processes.  An example of joint production arises with 
modern telecommunications switches, which are combinations of computers and switch 
blocks.
27  Switches route calls, but they also provide other services such as voice mail.  
The same computer is used to provide both services in a less costly manner than if 
switching and voice mail were provided separately.  Again economies of scope are one of 
the stated reasons for required resale of network functions by incumbent telephone 
companies to their competitors.  A further indication of the importance of economies of 
                                                 
25 See e.g. A.E. Kahn (1988), vol. II, pp. 119. ff. 
26 Economies of scale can often appear as economies of density in telecommunications, 
but the basic notion is the same. 
27 For a further discussion of economies of scope with switches see Hausman and 
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scope is the importance of “common costs” in debates over regulated prices.  Common 
costs are typically defined to be costs that arise from two (or more) services, but the costs 
are not incrementally caused by either service alone.  Regulatory bodies such as the 
Canadian CRTC and some state regulatory bodies have arbitrarily set a markup to the 
“direct” cost of 20 to 25% to account for common costs. 
  Yet economists know that most modern competitive companies have joint 
production and common costs for the production of their outputs.  These competitive 
companies base their prices on competitive conditions for their products.  Competitive 
conditions take account of demand conditions that arise from overall market demand for 
the product as well as firm demand conditions that arise as a result of competition.  
Although regulators often say they want to replicate the outcome of a competitive 
process, they miss the obvious point that a competitive process involves cost factors as 
well as demand factors.  Regulators, to the contrary, often ignore the effect of demand 
factors on competitive outcomes.  Instead, regulators use arbitrary markups over some 
measure of incremental (or variable) cost to account for economies of scale and 
economies of scope.   
  An additional necessary assumption for a non-substitution theorem to hold is that 
the economy is on a steady state growth path.  This assumption allows for durable capital 
goods to enter the model.  This assumption for an economy may be a reasonable 
approximation in certain circumstances, but for the telecommunications sector it departs 
from any approximation to economic reality.  Economists agree that the 
telecommunications sectors are among the most dynamic in the economy.  And since a 
substantial portion of the durable capital goods used in the telecommunications sector are 
closely connected to semiconductors and optical transmission, innovations in these 
sectors will directly affect investment in capital goods in telecommunications.  Thus, the 
steady-state growth assumption is not a good assumption for telecommunications.  
Thus, our evaluation is that modern telecommunications differ in many significant 
and quantitatively important ways from the necessary conditions for price to be 
independent of demand.  Economies of scale and economies of scope are universally 
recognized to be important economic characteristics of modern telecommunications 
networks.  The regulatory attempt to set prices as if they were the outcome of a   17
competitive process but to ignore the importance of demand factors and competitive 
conditions leads to what we call the "regulatory fallacy."    
No serious student of economics would claim that the necessary conditions for the 
non-substitution theorem hold in a telecommunication network environment.  Yet the 
regulatory assumption that price would be based on cost alone in a competitive market is 
wrong.  Economic theory has developed precise condition when price is independent of 
demand, and they do not hold, even as an approximation, in telecommunications.  Thus 
regulators are acting on an erroneous belief that, with competition, price equals cost, 
independent of demand. This erroneous belief leads directly to the resulting regulatory 
fallacy.  The consequent use of arbitrary allocations and markups to regulated prices to 
take account of fixed and common costs— which are exactly the costs that arise from 
economies of scale and scope—leads to significant consumers harm.  If regulators instead 
took account of demand factors in setting regulated prices, economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare could be increased significantly.  For example, Hausman (1998a) 
estimated that the FCC caused a deadweight loss to the economy exceeding $10 billion 
per year when it levied a “tax” to fund broadband connections in schools, when an 
alternative method of raising the same amount of funds would have led to a deadweight 
loss of approximately zero. 
 
C.  Distortions to Competition 
Why does incorrect regulation harm consumers more when competition exists?  Let 
us consider an incumbent fixed line provider who decides to explore the economic 
potential of upgrading its network by increasing fiber penetration.  This upgrade would 
likely cost in the billions of dollars and would be largely a sunk cost investment.  The 
company would have an economic incentive to invest in the upgrade so it could provide 
higher speed DSL (broadband Internet) service to compete better with cable providers 
who until recently had  a 67% market share of broadband Internet connections through 
cable modems, although DSL has now increased its share from about 33% to 40%.  Cable 
modems typically provide both faster download speeds and faster upload speeds than   18
current telephone DSL service.
28  Cable companies typically charge a significant 
premium for their service, so incumbent investment would likely lead to increased 
competition and lower prices for consumers. 
A potential larger benefit to consumers would arise if the incumbent decided to 
provide pay television service in competition with cable.
29  Thus, economies of scope 
would exist in the provision of two services, DSL and pay TV over the same network.  
Cable companies have exercised market power for many years. The FCC has reported 
that monthly cable rates in January 2004 were 15.7 percent lower in areas where 
incumbent cable operators face competition from a wireline overbuilder.
30 Almost all of 
the cable competitors have suffered financial difficulties that have limited their ability to 
expand (for example, RCN in the United States), but an incumbent telecommunications 
company would have much greater financial resources. Thus, phone company entry into 
the pay TV market could lead to significant gains for consumers. 
However, under the initial implementation of the 1996 Act incumbents would be 
required to allow competitors to utilize these new investments at TELRIC based prices, 
which did not recognize the sunk cost character of the investments.
31  Further, because 
economies of scope that exist in the provision of DSL, some state regulators who set 
actual TELRIC rates (as did California), set the TELRIC rate for DSL elements at 
essentially zero.  Unsurprisingly, incumbent companies made little investment in next 
generation networks in the United States.  Since 2003, the FCC has begun to recognize 
the errors in its approach, in part at the direction of the D.C. Circuit, which by then had 
ruled three times that the FCC regulations on unbundling were inconsistent with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.  In August 2005, the FCC finally exempted DSL from 
all unbundling requirements because of competition from cable networks (subject to a 
                                                 
28 DSL speeds depend in part on the distance of the premise from the central office, but 
typically cable modems provide two to three times faster download speeds. 
29 These developments are currently ongoing in both Canada and New Zealand. 
30.Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, 
and Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 4 ¶ 12 (2005).  
31 In the US state regulatory commissions set TELRIC price based on the FCC 
framework.  Quite different results occurred because of the stat implementation of 
TELRIC prices.  Indeed, regulators almost always set TELRIC prices using the overall   19
one-year phase-out).
32  However, by refusing for nearly a decade to recognize the role of 
competition and instead using cost-based regulation that did not take account of the risks 
of sunk cost investment in new technologies, the FCC has severely distorted competition 
and harmed consumers.  First-order losses to social welfare occur in these types of 
situations when new products are not introduced to consumers.
33  
 
IV. Has Unbundling the Network Achieved its Goals? 
In the 1990s, mandatory unbundling became the proposed remedy of choice in 
telecommunications regulatory proceedings. In the United States, the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 rests on the hypothesis that requiring a firm to share the 
use of its facilities with its competitors will enable the competitors eventually to build 
their own facilities, presumably to the eventual benefit of consumers. The mandatory 
sharing of facilities is thus the prelude to eventual competition between rival 
infrastructures or platforms. The corollary of this assumption is that, but for this exact 
form of regulatory intervention, natural market forces cannot be counted on to produce 
facilities-based competition.  
Any firm may choose to unbundle or lease components of its network with a third 
party at a voluntarily negotiated rate. The firm is also able to decide the scope of 
unbundling it wants to undertake—how much of its network to resell. The term 
‘mandatory unbundling’ describes an involuntary exchange between an incumbent 
network operator and a rival at a regulated rate where the scope of unbundling is 
determined by regulators. Determination of the access rate thus becomes the major bone 
of contention between incumbent and entrant, as a regulatory access rate that is equal to 
the voluntarily agreed-upon access rate cannot really be said to constitute ‘mandatory’ 
unbundling. When formulating that access rate, regulators have generally opted in favor 
of a measure of total element long-run incremental cost (TELRIC) or total service long-
                                                                                                                                                 
company cost of capital, rather than taking account of the much higher risk that arises 
with sunk cost investments.  See Hausman (1997, 1998, 2003) and Pindyck (2004). 
32 Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, CC Dkt. No. 05-150, 5 August 
2005. 
33 For a further explanation of the first-order effects see Hausman (1997, 2003).   20
run incremental cost (TSLRIC) and against a measure of opportunity cost or option 
value.
34 
Mandatory unbundling at a regulated rate may apply to various ‘network 
elements,’ which are defined by the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 as ‘a facility 
or equipment used in the provision of a telecommunications service.’
35 The Act instructs 
the FCC to consider whether ‘the failure to provide access to such network elements 
would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the 
services that it seeks to offer.’
36 Under the Act, prices for unbundled network elements 
(UNEs) are based on the cost of providing the interconnection or network element.
37 The 
FCC interpreted that pricing rule as ‘forward-looking, long-run, incremental cost.’
38 In 
practice, prices are ‘based on the TSLRIC [total service long run incremental cost] of the 
network element . . . and will include a reasonable allocation of forward-looking joint and 
common costs.’ 
As part of its Triennial Review Order of its unbundling regulations, the FCC 
explained that ILECs were required to provide access to network elements ‘to the extent 
that those elements are capable of being used by the requesting carrier in the provision of 
a telecommunications service.’
39 The FCC ordered all ILECs to make available at 
regulated rates the following UNEs: 
  
(1)   stand-alone copper loops and subloops for the provision of narrowband and 
broadband services,  
                                                 
34. For a detailed analysis of the scope of the unbundling decision and the access pricing 
decision by a telecommunications regulator, see Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, A 
Consumer-Welfare Approach to Mandatory Unbundling of Telecommunications 
Networks, 109 Yale L.J. 417 (1999).  
35 47 U.S.C. § 153(29).  
36 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(B). 
37 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).   
38 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996; Interconnection between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service Providers, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 95-185, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 15499, ¶ 620 (1996) [First Report & Order]. 
39. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange 
Carriers, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, CC Dkt. No. 01-338, 20 August 2003, p. 42 ¶ 59 [Triennial Review], rev’d, 
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(2)   fiber loops for narrowband service in fiber loop overbuild situations where the 
incumbent LEC elects to retire existing copper loops,  
(3)   subloops necessary to access wiring at or near a multiunit customer premises,  
(4)   network interface devices (NID), which are defined as any means of 
interconnecting the ILEC’s loop distribution plant to wiring at a customer 
premises location,  
(5)   dark fiber, DS3, and DS1 transport, subject to a route-specific review by the states 
to identify available wholesale facilities,  
(6)   local circuit switching serving the mass market,  
(7)   shared transport only to the extent that carriers are impaired without access to 
unbundled switching,  
(8)   signaling network when a carrier is purchasing unbundled switching, and  
(9)   call-related databases when a requesting carrier purchases unbundled access to the 
incumbent LEC’s switching,  
(10)   operations support systems (OSS) for qualifying services, which consists of pre-
ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing functions 
supported by an ILEC’s databases and information, and  
(11)   combinations of UNEs, including the loop-transport combination (enhanced 
extended link, or EEL).  
Based on this exhaustive list, it is reasonable to conclude that, at least in the United 
States, virtually no component of an incumbent’s network was immune from unbundling 
obligations eight years after the passage of the Telecommunications Act. 
b. Line Sharing Versus Bitstream Access of Data Services 
Bitstream access provides service-level (resale) entry to digital subscriber line 
(DSL) data provision. Under the bitstream approach, the entrant buys the complete 
service for a high-speed link to the consumer, and the service includes delivery to the first 
data switch in the incumbent’s network. Unbundled network line sharing, by contrast, 
allows the entrant to acquire the high-frequency portion of the copper connection but 
requires it to make some investments in infrastructure. 
Mandatory line sharing was attempted and then abandoned in the United States. 
In the FCC’s Line Sharing Order released in 1999, the FCC directed ILECs to provide   22
the high-frequency portion of the local loop (HFPL) to requesting carriers as a UNE.
40 
The Commission found in the Line Sharing Order that ‘[t]he record shows that lack of 
access would materially raise the cost for competitive LECs to provide advanced services 
[such as DSL] to residential and small business users, delay broad facilities-based market 
entry and materially limit the scope and quality of competitor service offerings.’ In May 
2002, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the Line Sharing 
Order, finding that the Commission had failed to give adequate consideration to existing 
facilities-based competition in the provision of broadband services, especially by cable 
systems.
41 In its August 2003 Triennial Review Order, the FCC decided not to reinstate 
the vacated line-sharing rules because it determined that ‘continued unbundled access to 
stand-alone copper loops and subloops enables a requesting carrier to offer and recover 
its costs from all of the services that the loop supports, including broadband service.’
42 
The FCC rejected its prior finding that lack of separate access to the high 
frequency portion would cause impairment for four reasons. The two most important 
reasons from our viewpoint is that the FCC noted that the difficulties of cost allocation 
for different portions of a single loop had led most states to price the high frequency 
portion of the loop at approximately zero, which distorted competitive incentives. Also, 
the FCC recognized the substantial intermodal competition from cable companies, which 
lessened any competitive benefits associated with line sharing.  In its March 2004 
opinion, the D.C. Circuit upheld the FCC’s decision to eliminate line sharing, concluding 
that the FCC ‘reasonably found that other considerations outweighed any impairment.’
43 
The court added that ‘intermodal competition from cable ensures the persistence of 
substantial competition in broadband.’ 
Regulators in other nations have chosen bitstream access over line sharing. For 
example, in December 2003, the New Zealand Commerce Commission recommended the 
                                                 
40 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability 
and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, CC Dkt. Nos. 98-147, 96-98, Third Report and Order in CC Dkt. No. 98-147 
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42 See Triennial Review, p. 125 ¶ 199. 
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designation of an ‘asymmetric DSL bitstream access service.’
44 The agency defined 
ADSL bitstream access service as ‘a high speed IP access service which provides good 
performance, but could not typically support extensive use of mission critical applications 
which require excellent real-time network performance or availability.’ The Commission 
defined bitstream access as a situation in which the incumbent’s access link ‘is made 
available to other operators, which are then able to provide high-speed services to end-
consumers.’ The agency concluded the net social benefits from bitstream access exceeded 
the net social benefits of line sharing due to the lower total cost of providing the 
unbundled service (collocation costs are avoided in bitstream access). The Commission 
reasoned that, under bitstream access, entrants face a lower risk of investing in network 
components such as DSLAMs that might not be fully utilized. We discuss the New 
Zealand experience in greater detail in a later section. 
  In February 2005, the FCC released a new unbundling order that, most 
significantly, eliminated UNE-P as a separate network element entitled to mandatory 
unbundling.
45 The Commission found that the ability of CLECs to compete would not be 
impaired if they did not have access to unbundled switching at TELRIC prices. The FCC 
also established new unbundling rules for mass market local circuit switching, high-
capacity loops, and dedicated interoffice transport. With switching removed from the list 
of UNEs, it followed that UNE-P could no longer be mandated at regulated TELRIC 
prices—although ILECs obviously could still offer UNE-P to CLECs at commercially 
negotiated rates. The FCC also found that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not 
require that the agency mandate ILECs to offer UNE-P.  
Despite the reasonable prospect that it could eventually be thrown out by the D.C. 
Circuit, mandatory UNE-P at TELRIC rates had become the cornerstone of the business 
plan for AT&T and MCI in the local market. In the case of AT&T, the company had 
abandoned its facilities-based strategy for local markets by selling off its cable television 
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Investigation into Unbundling the Local Loop Network and the Fixed Public Data 
Network, Final Report, December 2003 (available at 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/telecommunications/llu/finalreport.PDF). 
45 Order on Remand, In re Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 2005 FCC LEXIS 
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assets at an enormous loss of approximately $40-50 billion, and it spun off AT&T 
Wireless, which soon merged with Cingular, the joint venture of SBC and BellSouth. 
With the commercial and regulatory demise of  mandatory UNE-P, and with its long 
distance revenues under increasing pressure from Bell company entry following the 
completion of the section 271 approval process for the RBOCs in all states and the 
District of Columbia, AT&T was rapidly becoming a brand name in search of a product. 
Although AT&T embarked on yet another non-facilities-based strategy by negotiating 
with Sprint PCS to rebrand wholesale wireless minutes as an AT&T cellphone product, 
the highest priority for AT&T’s management (and, similarly, the prize for the managers 
who took MCI through Chapter 11 reorganization) was to concentrate on readying the 
company for sale to one of the three financially stable RBOCs. Thus, AT&T with its 
symbol “T” (telephone) on the NYSE and its long history as the primary company in US 
telecommunications, lacked an economic rationale for its continued existence. 
A.  Rationales for Network Unbundling 
We examine the theoretical underpinnings of mandatory unbundling. We also 
survey the rationales offered by regulatory agencies in support of mandatory unbundling. 
In general, mandatory unbundling was believed to, among other items, (1) generate 
competition in retail markets through greater innovation and investment and lower prices, 
(2) generate greater competition in wholesale markets, and (3) encourage entrants to 
migrate from unbundling to facilities-based approach. Because our focus is on the 
benefits of mandatory unbundling, we do not consider its regulatory costs, such as the 
difficulties in implementation or compliance costs for operators. When considering 
unbundling, a regulator also should take account of a full range of efficiency 
considerations, including allocative (consumer welfare gains associated with greater 
penetration at lower prices), productive efficiency (producer surplus associated with 
reductions in marginal costs), and dynamic efficiency (how welfare is generated and 
distributed over time). 
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1.  Rationale 1: Competition in Retail Markets Is Desirable 
In a static model that does not consider investment in future periods, consumers 
benefit from mandatory unbundling to the extent that such regulation lowers retail prices. 
In a dynamic model, mandatory unbundling at regulated rates runs the risk of decreasing 
investment by both incumbent ILECs (by truncating returns by granting a ‘free option’ to 
new entrant CLECs)
46 and CLECs (by increasing the relative return of UNE-based entry). 
Despite these factors, proponents argued that the net of effect of mandatory unbundling 
was to increase investment by both ILECs and CLECs. 
a)  Innovation and Investment 
According to its proponents, mandatory unbundling at regulated rates encourages 
innovation and investment on behalf of both incumbents and entrants. In its Third Order 
implementing the Telecommunications Act, the FCC explained that a positive by-product 
of mandatory unbundling at TELRIC was greater innovation on behalf of entrants and 
incumbents: 
Unbundling rules that encourage competitors to deploy their own facilities in the long run will 
provide incentives for both incumbents and competitors to invest and innovate, and will allow 
the Commission and the states to reduce regulation once effective facilities-based competition 
develops.
47  
The more competitors in the market, the FCC reasoned, the greater the incentive to 
introduce a new technology to gain a technological edge. With the correct incentives in 
place, the need for wholesale regulation would disappear: 
The unbundling standards we adopt in this Order . . . seeks [sic] to create incentives for both 
incumbents and requesting carriers to invest and innovate in new technologies by establishing a 
mechanism by which regulatory obligations to provide access to network elements will be 
reduced as alternatives to the incumbent LECs’ network elements become available in the 
future.  
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With greater facilities-based investment, the FCC reasoned, the market could one day be 
relied upon to discipline ILEC prices for local services.  
Although it was aware of arguments that mandatory unbundling at regulated rates 
might discourage ILEC investment, the FCC believed that other factors in the 
marketplace would mitigate these negative effects: 
We acknowledge that the incumbent LEC argument that unbundling may adversely affect 
innovation is consistent with economic theory, but events in the marketplace suggest that other 
factors may be driving incumbent LECs to invest in xDSL technologies, notwithstanding the 
economic theory. 
For example, investment by cable companies in cable modem service was believed to be 
sufficient motivation for ILECs to invest in DSL facilities. Although the negative 
investment effects might not overcome these other factors, it is not clear how mandatory 
unbundling at regulated rates actually increases investment by ILECs. One theory is that 
an ILEC would have to respond to greater competition from CLECs by investing in new 
facilities. But to the extent that those new investments would be subject to unbundling 
rules, those investments might not be undertaken.
48 Another theory is that the ILEC will 
invest in new access technologies that potentially will not be subject to unbundling rules. 
b)  Prices and Retail Margins 
When a CLEC obtains an access line at incremental cost, it is free to charge the 
end user an amount anywhere between the incremental cost and the retail price. A CLEC 
can charge below incremental cost if it can bundle the access line with other services 
such as vertical services or long distance. Competition among CLECs is predicted in 
theory to discipline CLECs in their pricing behavior. If competition among CLECs is 
intense, then the retail price offered by CLECs should equal the access price for the 
unbundled loop plus the incremental cost of other inputs. Finally, ILECs must respond to 
price cuts by CLECs with their own price cuts. The equilibrium outcome of that game is 
lower prices. 
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The FCC believed that the Telecommunications Act encouraged the agency to 
promote retail price competition through mandatory unbundling: 
[T]he 1996 Act set the stage for a new competitive paradigm in which carriers in previously 
segregated markets are able to compete in a dynamic and integrated telecommunications market 
that promises lower prices and more innovative services to consumers.
49 
Even if the mandatory unbundling at TELRIC never led to facilities-based competition, 
the FCC reasoned, consumers would be better off to the extent that prices for local 
services declined: 
National requirements for unbundling allow [sic] requesting carriers, including small entities, to 
take advantage of economies of scale in network. Requesting carriers, which may include small 
entities, should have access to the same technologies and economies of scale and scope 
available to incumbent LECs. Having such access will facilitate competition and help lower 
prices for all consumers, including individuals and small entities. 
Because ILECs enjoyed a cost advantage vis-à-vis CLECs, the FCC argued, it was 
preferable from a social welfare perspective for retail prices to be based on the ILECs’ 
costs and not on the CLECs’ costs. Because ILECs are subject to state-sponsored price 
regulation, it was not clear that prices would decrease absent subsidized UNE rates. 
Although the FCC was concerned about stimulating retail competition for local telephone 
and broadband access services, most European regulators focused exclusively on 
stimulating retail competition in broadband markets. 
2.  Rationale 2: Competition in Retail Markets Cannot Be Achieved 
Without Mandatory Unbundling 
Even if competition in retail markets is desirable, it is still necessary to show that 
competition would not occur in the absence of mandatory unbundling. In this section, we 
explain the reasoning articulated by unbundling proponents as to why natural market 
forces cannot deliver the benefits of competition in local services. 
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a)  A Vertically Integrated Firm Generally Prefers Its Own 
Downstream Affiliate 
In general, a vertically integrated firm prefers retail sales by its affiliated retail 
division to sales by an unaffiliated retailer. This preference can be reversed, however, if 
the access price exceeds the retail margin. Much academic work has been dedicated to 
analyzing the incentives of vertically integrated firms to deny access to key inputs to 
unaffiliated downstream rivals.
50 If a vertically integrated firm can solidify its market 
power in future periods by refusing to deal with rivals in a downstream market, then that 
firm has an anticompetitive reason for such a refusal to deal.
51 A vertically integrated 
firm might also refuse to deal with other unaffiliated firms in the downstream market as a 
means to acquire market power in that market. 
Although no ILEC prefers unbundling its network elements at a regulated rate to 
selling its services through its own retail division, some ILECs have voluntarily 
unbundled their network elements to rivals at a commercially negotiated rate. For 
example, in January 1995, Rochester Telephone implemented its own ‘Open Market 
Plan’ for unbundling network services in New York.
52 Under the Open Market Plan, 
Rochester restructured itself into a network services company, which retained the 
Rochester name, and a competitive company, Frontier Communications of Rochester, 
which the New York Public Service Commission regulated as a non-dominant carrier. 
Rochester provided on an unbundled, non-discriminatory basis the local loop, switching, 
and transport functions as a wholesaler, at discounted (yet voluntary) prices lower than its 
standard retail rates. 
b)  Entry Barriers Prevent Natural Competition 
In the United States, a CLEC is considered ‘impaired’ when lack of access to an 
incumbent LEC network element poses a barrier to entry that is likely to make entry into 
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a market ‘uneconomic.’
53 In its Triennial Review Order, the FCC offered the following 
factors that contribute to entry barriers in the provision of local telephone service: (1) 
scale economies, (2) sunk costs, (3) first-mover advantages, (4) absolute cost advantages, 
(5) and barriers within the control of ILECs. The FCC’s explanation of sunk costs 
provides some insight as to the regulator’s decision-making:  
Sunk costs increase a new entrant’s cost of failure. Potential new entrants may also fear that an 
incumbent LEC that has incurred substantial sunk costs will drop prices to protect its investment 
in the face of new entry. In addition, sunk costs can give significant first-mover advantages to 
the incumbent LEC, which has incurred these costs over many years and has already had the 
opportunity to recoup many of these costs through its rates. 
According to its proponents, mandatory unbundling is necessary to overcome such 
barriers. The corollary of this proposition is that, without mandatory unbundling, 
facilities-based investment cannot occur. In its May 2002 decision vacating certain 
portions of the UNE Remand Order, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Commission had 
failed to adequately explain how a uniform national rule for assessing impairment would 
help to achieve the goals of the Act, including the promotion of facilities-based 
competition.
54 
Opponents of mandatory unbundling also cite the large sunk cost of the ILEC’s 
network, but for different reasons. They argue that sunk costs imply that regulators 
should abstain from appropriating the quasi-rents of ILECs, which undermines the 
incentive of ILECs to invest in new technologies.
55 They also argue that, to the extent 
that network investment cannot be directed toward other uses in the event of low market 
demand, large sunk costs require that access prices are set higher than what would 
otherwise be necessary to induce investment under a standard present discounted value 
calculation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
52  FCC News Release, Rochester Telephone Corporation Granted Rule Waivers to 
Implement its Open Market Plan, 7 March 1995 (available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/ News_Releases/1995/nrcc5030.txt).  
53  See Triennial Review, p. 9.  
54  See USTA, p. 427 (emphasis in original). 
55 For a description of the role of sunk costs in access pricing and unbundling, see 
generally Hausman & Sidak (1999).   30
3.  Rationale 3: Mandatory Unbundling Enables Future Facilities-Based 
Investment 
Access-based competition is supposedly the stepping stone to facilities-based 
competition. This proposition, or hypothesis, lies at the heart of regulatory decisions on 
unbundling and access pricing that the FCC and its counterparts in other nations have 
made since the mid 1990s. In the telecommunications industry, the examples of the 
stepping-stone hypothesis are numerous. For example, MCI successfully made the 
transition from reseller of long-distance services to facilities-based carrier. The leasing of 
selected unbundled elements at regulated prices is vigorously defended by CLECs and 
regulators as a complement to subsequent facilities-based entry, not a substitute for it. 
Within the strata of regulated access-based entry options, regulators may consider UNE-P 
to be a stepping stone to a CLEC’s subsequent investment in its own switches and its 
more limited reliance on unbundled local loops.
56 
In implementing the unbundling rules, the FCC sought to follow the intent of 
Congress by creating an intermediate phase of competition, during which some new 
companies would deploy their own facilities to compete directly with the incumbents:  
Although Congress did not express explicitly a preference for one particular competitive 
arrangement, it recognized implicitly that the purchase of unbundled network elements would, at 
least in some situations, serve as a transitional arrangement until fledgling competitors could 
develop a customer base and complete the construction of their own networks.
57  
The FCC thus sought to force the incumbents to allow others to access their systems, in 
the hope that mandatory unbundling would create competitors who would later invest in 
their own facilities. 
In the long run, the FCC expected that entrants would build their own facilities 
because doing so would enhance the entrants’ ability to compete more effectively with 
incumbents: 
                                                 
56  Similarly, regulators may consider mandatory roaming at regulated prices to be a 
stepping stone to a wireless carrier’s eventual investment in base stations and spectrum in 
another geographic region. However, a component of the relevant infrastructure is radio 
spectrum, the allocation of which is controlled by the government (at least in the primary 
market). Consequently, it is not clear where the stepping stone of mandated access leads 
in wireless.   31
We fully expect that over time competitors will prefer to deploy their own facilities in markets 
where it is economically feasible to do so, because it is only through owning and operating their 
own facilities that competitors have control over the competitive and operational characteristics 
of their service, and have the incentive to invest and innovate in new technologies that will 
distinguish their services from those of the incumbent. 
Thus, mandatory unbundling would allow entrants to derive revenue from offering 
services over the unbundled network elements, and then use that revenue to construct 
their own networks once the technology shifted. Of course, if the access rate were set too 
low, the transition to facilities-based competitor would not occur, as CLECs would never 
find it in their interests to invest in their own facilities. If access rates were set just right, 
this transition to facilities-based competition would generate additional social benefits, 
which are described in the next section. 
 
4.  Rationale 4: Competition in Wholesale Access Markets Is Desirable 
Competition in the input markets was, by itself, desirable. In this section, we 
review how input-level competition can, in theory, generate technological innovation and 
incentives for gains in productive efficiency and can eventually lead to regulatory 
withdrawal.  
a)  A Network of Networks 
Facilities-based entry by CLECs in the current period meant that future entrants would 
not have to depend exclusively on ILECs to obtain network elements. The FCC believed 
that mandatory unbundling would expedite this process: 
Moreover, in some areas, we believe that the greatest benefits may be achieved through 
facilities-based competition, and that the ability of requesting carriers to use unbundled network 
elements, including various combinations of unbundled network elements, is a necessary 
precondition to the subsequent deployment of self-provisioned network facilities.  
In theory, facilities-based entry generates ‘greater benefits’ than UNE-based entry 
because the former signals a credible commitment to stay in the market. If an entrant has 
not made sunk investments in infrastructure, it cannot use sunk costs to make that signal. 
                                                                                                                                                 
57  See Third Order, note 40, ¶ 6 (emphasis added).   32
Nor will the incumbent face the prospect of durable capacity that survives the demise of 
the company that invested to create it. Moreover, facilities-based competition leads to 
technological diversity, which increases choice and may provide newer and better 
services because the CLEC does not depend on a legacy network. 
The FCC envisioned that facilities-based entrants would spawn a new generation of 
UNE-based entrants, who in subsequent periods would become facilities-based entrants:  
In order for competitive networks to develop, the incumbent LECs’ bottleneck control over 
interconnection must dissipate. As the market matures and the carriers providing services in 
competition with the incumbent LECs’ local exchange offerings grow, we believe these carriers 
may establish direct routing arrangements with one another, forming a network of networks 
around the current system. 
Thus, the FCC believed that mandatory unbundling at TELRIC would evolve into 
voluntary access arrangements. Under this scenario, some facilities-based entrants might 
choose to become a pure wholesaler of network elements, leaving the retail component to 
other CLECs. 
b)  Regulatory Withdrawal 
Competition among facilities-based providers to supply network elements to future 
generations of CLECs would decrease the price of those network elements. The next 
generation of CLECs would, in turn, pass those savings along to end users in the form of 
lower retail prices. At some point in the process, the regulator could, in theory, withdraw 
and allow a competitive market for inputs to discipline the price of retail service. 
In practice, however, regulators are reluctant to relinquish their power to control entry 
and allocate rents in a given market. This vision of mandatory unbundling also ignores 
the strategic use of regulation by competitors. Given the large rents at stake, it is not 
realistic to believe that the regulatory machinery could be dismantled very easily. Indeed, 
in the United States, the degree of regulation has increased since the passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
In summary, mandatory unbundling was based on the following rationales: (1) 
competition in retail markets is desirable, (2) competition in retail markets cannot be 
achieved without mandatory unbundling, (3) mandatory unbundling promotes future 
facilities-based investment, the stepping-stone hypothesis, and (4) competition in   33
wholesale access markets is desirable. Fortunately, there is testable hypothesis associated 
with each rationale.  
 
V. The Unbundling Experience in the United States, United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand 
The previous section considered how mandatory unbundling should work in 
theory. With the benefit of several years of experience, we turn now to an evaluation of 
the extent to which the rationales for mandatory unbundling were substantiated in 
practice. We note that many of the studies we refer to are necessarily confounded by the 
effects of the telecom boom and bust of the late 19900s and early 2000s.  Further, many 
of the studies cannot be claimed to be necessarily causal in nature; nevertheless, the data 
presented in them is often suggestive of the economic effects. Also, due to the small 
sample nature of the outcomes differing interpretation can exist (and do exist) regarding 
the economic reasons for a particular outcome.  We discuss what we consider the primary 
interpretation with differing interpretations also noted. 
We focus on the unbundling experience in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and New Zealand.  For each country, we examine whether any of the four primary 
rationales for mandatory unbundling at TELRIC was substantiated in practice. We rely 
on data from the relevant regulatory agency that implemented the unbundling regime. For 
example, we discuss why regulators in New Zealand did not adopt mandatory 
unbundling.  
In compiling the country surveys, we observed a large variation in the degree to 
which economic analysis informed the regulator’s decision-making process. In the United 
States, for example, the process was informed by legal interpretation of specific language 
(such as the meaning of ‘impaired’) or by engineering measures of hypothetical operating 
costs. In New Zealand, by contrast, the process was informed largely by economic 
analysis and by international experience with mandatory unbundling. Using economic 
methods, the New Zealand regulator literally assigned net welfare gains to each 
regulatory option and selected the path with the greatest net welfare gain. New Zealand 
had the benefit of studying the experience of other nations before it decided on the 
optimal regulatory approach. The FCC still has not used economic analysis when   34
modifying its rules, despite the fact that the United States now has more than six years of 
unbundling experience. 
A. United States 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ordered the FCC to introduce competition 
into the local services market by forcing ILECs to provide entrants access to the ILECs’ 
existing facilities at regulated rates. In 1999, the FCC explained that Congress did not 
provide the agency much flexibility in the exact form of managed competition: ‘Congress 
directed the Commission to implement the provisions of section 251, and to specifically 
determine which network elements should be unbundled pursuant to section 251(c)(3).7’ 
Hence, the FCC did not have the discretion to reject or embrace any of the rationales for 
mandatory unbundling. The only decisions left to the FCC concerned the extent of 
mandatory unbundling—namely, which elements would be included in the list of UNEs 
and the appropriate pricing of those elements.  
1. Retail Competition 
In this section, we review the unbundling experience in the United States with respect to 
retail pricing and investment. 
a. Pricing 
Retail competition triggered by mandatory unbundling should manifest itself in terms of 
lower retail prices. Even if price regulation of local services by state PUCs were binding, 
the introduction of UNE-based competition could still reduce price. In the United States, 
however, mandatory unbundling does not appear to have decreased local service prices 
measurably—despite the fact that CLECs had more than 13 percent of the nation’s access 
lines by 2003. Figure 3 shows the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Consumer Price 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers, Telephone Services, Local Charges 
(available at http://data.bls.gov/labjava/outside.jsp?survey=cu). 
Note: Prices normalized to 1984 dollars. 
 
As Figure 3 shows, prices of local telephone services offered by all carriers in urban 
areas grew at a slower annual rate on average before passage of the Act (1.21 percent 
versus 2.96 percent).  
It bears emphasis that such price comparisons do not control for other changes in 
the price of local service. For example, since the passage of the Telecommunications Act, 
the subscriber line charge (SLC) was increased and long-distance access prices were 
decreased. Hence, a small part of the BLS’ CPI price increase might be attributable to 
regulatory tax shifting. According to the FCC, the average residential rate for local 
service provided by ILECs in urban areas before taxes, fees, and miscellaneous charges 
increased from $13.71 in 1996 to $14.55 in 2002.
58 Hence, mandatory unbundling does 
not appear to have decreased retail prices in the way the FCC intended.  This experience 
is in marked contrast to the prices of other telecommunications services, which uniformly 
                                                 
58  Trends in Telephone Service, FCC Industry Analysis Division, 2003 Report, p. 13-1 
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decreased over the same period.
59  An alternative interpretation of Figure 3 is that the 
increased prices are the result of rebalancing of the relative price differences between 
residential and business rates; however, the basic fact we emphasize is that price increase 
were greater after the Telecom Act was implemented when most other 
telecommunications prices were falling rapidly in real terms. 
b. Investment 
Many scholars have examined the effect of mandatory unbundling on ILEC 
investment. For example, in work performed for AT&T (the largest CLEC) and 
submitted to the FCC, Robert D. Willig, William H. Lehr, John P. Bigelow, and Stephen 
B. Levinson examined the relationship between UNE-P wholesale rates and Bell 
companies’ capital expenditures.
60 They attempted to distinguish between the 
‘competitive stimulus hypothesis’ that UNE-P creates competition that induces increased 
ILEC network investment and the ‘investment deterrence hypothesis’ that UNE-P 
diminishes the return on network investment by ILECs and causes them to invest less. 
Willig et al. hypothesized that TELRIC-based UNE-P rates encourage entry by CLECs, 
which forces Bell companies to invest more in their networks to protect market share. 
They therefore expected to find that ILEC capital expenditures are inversely related to 
UNE-P prices. They calculated that the elasticity of ILEC investment to UNE-P prices 
was between -2.1 and -2.9, meaning that a 1 percent decrease in the UNE-P rate 
generated between a 2.1 and 2.9 percent increase in ILEC investment. 
In a book published by the Brookings Institution, Robert W. Crandall explained 
that the loss of end-user subscribers to CLECs reduces ILECs’ revenues by more than 
their costs.
61 Crandall found that, whereas ILECs lose roughly 60 percent of the revenues 
associated with a given line when provisioned on an unbundled, rather than retail, basis, 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/trend803.pdf). 
59 The prices of telecommunication equipment were decreasing over this period at the 
rate of approximately 8%-10% per year. 
60  Robert D. Willig/William H. Lehr/John P. Bigelow/Stephen B. Levinson, Stimulating 
Investment and the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Paper filed by AT&T in FCC 
Docket 01-338, 11 October 2002. [Willig et al.] 
61  Robert W. Crandall, Competition and Chaos: The U.S. Telecommunications Sector 
Since 1996 (Washington, DC: Brookings Press 2004).    37
the avoided costs of customer service and marketing are only about 10 percent of the Bell 
companies’ total costs. 
Crandall also examined the relationship between the FCC’s state-by-state capital 
expenditure data and the various measures of state UNE-P rates found in various studies. 
Crandall hypothesized that the UNE-P rate should not have a significant negative effect 
on capital expenditures because it is not logical to invest more if the ILEC receives less 
revenue under mandatory unbundling. Crandall concluded that none of the previous 
studies provided support for the theory that UNE-P rates have influenced capital spending 
by Bell companies. Crandall further demonstrated that Bell companies scaled back their 
capital expenditures in 2002 and 2003, and that the decline in capital expenditures was 
greatest in those states that reduced their UNE-P rates. However, as discussed above, 
these results may well be confounded with the effects of the telecom boom and bust 
period.  The fact that RBOC revenue and investment has been reduced relative to historic 
averages implies that mandatory unbundling in the United States did not achieve its 
intended effect if these effects arose from the effects of mandatory unbundling.  
We turn to the question of CLEC investment in the next sections on entry barriers 
and the stepping stone hypothesis. Investment activities during the late 1990s were 
undoubtedly affected by exceptional capital market conditions during the telecom boom 
period when access to capital market by technology companies (and especially 
telecommunications companies) was extremely cheap. But capital expenditure by CLECs 
was modest even when considered in terms of the way in which the CLECs have applied 
their resources. For example, an analysis of financial statements of EarthLink and Covad, 
two data CLECs, suggests that the ratio of capital expenditure to sales was 5 to 6 percent 
in 2001 and 2002, compared to a ratio of 20 to 25 percent for ILECs such as Verizon, 
SBC, and BellSouth.
62  Similar results are found for other ILECs. 
2. Entry Barriers 
The second rationale for mandatory unbundling is that, without that particular 
form of regulatory intervention, market forces cannot deliver facilities-based competition. 
In the United States, cable telephony appears to disprove that proposition. According to   38
the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the number of cable telephony 
subscribers in the United States increased from 180,000 in the first quarter of 2000 to 2.5 
million by September 2003.
63 In addition to the deployment of circuit-switched 
telephony, many companies have begun trials or are launching voice over Internet 
protocol (VoIP) service. For example, in 2003 Cablevision launched Optimum Voice 
VoIP throughout its New York City service area of four million homes. As of December 
2006 all of the major cable companies are now offering cable-based voice services in 
competition with the ILECs.  The service typically combines local and unlimited long 
distance services.  Further, the service is often also often as a bundled service with 
broadband internet cable modem service and cable TV service in the so-called “triple 
play.”  The discounts of the bundled package are typically quite substantial (e.g. Comcast 
offers a discount of approximately 33%). 
In its Third Report in 1999, however, the FCC dismissed the emergence of cable 
telephony as a substitute for the ILECs’ fixed-line networks: 
We also disagree with the incumbent LECs’ argument that cable television service offers a 
viable alternative to the incumbent’s unbundled loop.  Cable service is largely restricted to 
residential subscribers, and generally supports only one-way service, not the two-way 
communications telephony requires. Moreover, we conclude that declining to unbundle loops in 
areas where cable telephony is available would be inconsistent with the Act’s goal of 
encouraging entry by multiple providers. Given that neither mobile nor fixed wireless can yet 
replace wireline service, if we were to take the incumbents’ approach, consumers might be left 
to a choose [sic] between only the cable company and the incumbent LEC.
64 
The FCC’s reasoning is unpersuasive. If two facilities-based carriers offer a similar 
service, and if the first carrier is not compelled to share its network with rivals, then 
consumers would no longer be subject to monopoly prices for local services. Moreover, 
the FCC’s suggestion that cable infrastructure supports only one-way service is outdated 
given that, as of June 2003, cable modems accounted for nearly two-thirds of all 
                                                                                                                                                 
62  Sales and capital expenditure data were taken from company annual reports. See also 
Hausman (2000b) who discusses Covad and other CLECs’ competitive strategies. 
63  National Cable Television Association, Statistics & Resources (available at 
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=86). 
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residential broadband subscriptions,
65 which is a two-way service.  Cable networks are 
now rapidly upgrading their service offerings to provide telephone service use VOIP 
technology. 
When the availability of cable telephony was on the verge of ubiquity in late 2003, 
the FCC was forced to offer a different explanation for why the threat of cable telephony 
should be discounted: 
As a general matter, while these [cable] systems are increasingly being used for the delivery of 
retail narrowband and broadband services (e.g., telephony and high-speed Internet access 
services), the record indicates that such systems are not being used currently to provide 
wholesale local loop offerings that might substitute for access to incumbent LECs’ loop 
facilities. Some cable companies also have augmented their networks to enable the provision of 
two-way voice telephony services. For such services, the cable infrastructure serves as a 
replacement for loops. At this time, however, deployment of voice telephony by cable 
companies has been substantially exceeded by the deployment of cable modem service.
66 
Hence, the FCC argued that unbundling of the ILECs’ network is necessary because 
cable operators were not inclined to share their own network with rivals at marginal cost. 
It bears emphasis that the D.C. Circuit rejected this very rationale for mandatory sharing 
of broadband in its May 2002 decision, explaining that competition removes the reason 
for mandatory sharing.
67 To date, the FCC has refused to recognize the effect of inter-
platform competition to fixed line telephony despite the D.C. Circuit’s repeated 
admonitions that such competition cannot be ignored. 
In May 2004, Comcast, the nation’s largest cable company, announced that it 
planned to offer phone service to half of the households reached by the company’s cable 
systems by the end of 2005 and to all 40 million of them by the end of 2006.
68 Verizon 
perceives the threat posed by cable telephony to be significant. Verizon began selling 
                                                 
65  See FCC High-Speed Services, , p. 10 (tbl. 3). 
66 Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange 
Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capability, CC Dkt. Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Report and Order 
and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C. Rcd. 
16,978, 16,979 ¶ 229 (2003) [Section 251 Review]. 
67 See USTA, p. 428.    40
video over fiber optic lines to homes and businesses in 2005, which is ‘part of a long-
term strategy to fight cable companies on their own turf before they erode too much of 
Verizon’s traditional telephone business.’
69 Verizon has already applied for licenses for 
cable franchises in several states.   AT&T (formerly SBC) has also begun to construct 
fiber networks that will provide pay-TV services.  Both Verizon and AT&T have decided 
that they need to offer a “triple play” bundle in competition with the cable companies.  
Both ILECs are investing in the tens of billions of dollar in these upgraded networks. 
Wireless phone service also constrains the ability of ILECs to raise the price of 
voice services. There is a growing evidence of ‘wireless substitution’ in the United 
States, which documents the degree to which consumers perceives wireless phones to be 
substitutes for fixed line connections. The California Public Utilities Commission in 
August 2006 found that wireless substitution accounts for approximately half of ILEC 
primary residential wireline losses.
70  The combined number of wireless and cable 
telephony subscribers as of 2004 exceeded the number of end-user switched access lines 
and has continued to increase rapidly since that time. Wireless substitution is not unique 
to the United States.  A JD Power and Associates survey in May 2004 revealed that 53 
percent of U.K. ‘contract customers use mobile as main method of communication.’
71 
The emergence of facilities-based competition for voice customers implies that the 
rationale for mandatory unbundling based on insurmountable barriers to entry is not 
substantiated in the United States. 
3. Stepping-Stone Hypothesis 
The stepping-stone hypothesis implies that CLECs will migrate toward facilities-
based entry over time as they gain market share. One way to measure the effect of 
mandatory unbundling on the method of CLEC entry is through time-series analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                 
68 Peter Grant,  Wall St. J., 26 May  2004, p. A3. 
69. Justin Hyde, Reuters News, 19 May  2004,  *1 
70 Most of the other ½ of residential wireline losses went to cable telephone providers.  
See Public Utilities Commission of the State of California, “Order Instituting Rulemaking 
on the Commission’s Own Motion to Assess and Revise the Regulation of 
Telecommunications Utilities,” Proposed Decision, 25 August 2006.  The CPUC found 
“Finding of Fact No. 39. Wireless service is a substitute for wireline service.” 
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Figure 4 demonstrates that, contrary to the stepping-stone hypothesis, CLECs are, in the 
aggregate, increasingly relying on UNE-P as their preferred mode of entry. 
 





















































Source: FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of 30 June 2003, at 6 (tbl. 3) (rel. 22 December 2003). 
Note: UNEs include UNE-loops and UNE-platform. 
 
The vertical axis is the share of total CLEC switched access lines: the sum of the shares 
across all types is 100 percent.
72 Whereas CLECs relied on UNEs for 23.9 percent of 
their lines in December 1999, by June 2003, UNE lines accounted for 58.5 percent of all 
CLEC lines.
73 Of all UNE lines in December 2002, 70.5 percent were acquired in 
combination with the ILEC’s switch.
74 The availability of wholesale access appears to 
                                                 
72 Since the total number of switched access lines was approximately constant over this 
period (although it has decreased more recently), we believe that discussing the share of 
CLEC Switch Access lines is easier to considering the total number of CLEC access 
lines.  Also, most regulatory analysis of CLECs has been in terms of their share of access 
lines.  
73 See FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of 30 June 2003, tbl. 3 (rel. 22 
December 2003) (available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/lcom1203.pdf) [hereinafter FCC Local Competition Report 2003].  
74  Id., table 4   42
have discouraged CLECs from investing in their own facilities (including switches) over 
time. 
  The increasing share of UNEs might be attributable to entry by new CLECs, which 
rely on UNEs extensively in their early stages. Stated differently, it is possible that 
mature CLECs have, in fact, made the transition to facilities-based lines but entry by new 
UNE-based CLECs is artificially inflating the share of CLEC lines that are UNEs. To 
examine this hypothesis, we analyzed the progress of 17 specific CLECs from the first 
quarter 2000 through the fourth quarter 2004. If the stepping stone hypothesis were valid, 
then one would expect to observe the share of facilities-based lines for a given CLEC to 
increase over time.  We found that a very small share of CLECs increased their share of 
facilities-based lines before the telecommunications meltdown of 2001. Roughly one-
quarter of the firms in the sample increased their share of facilities-based lines in 2000. 
The majority of the CLECs continued to rely on UNEs to the same extent during that 
time period.  Thus, we do not find evidence in support of the stepping-stone hypothesis.  
Other empirical analyses support the position that mandatory unbundling does not 
provide a stepping-stone to facilities-based investment. For example, Crandall, Ingraham, 
and Singer find that the share of CLEC lines that are facilities-based is lower in states 
where the UNE rental rates are lower, which suggests that unbundling decreases 
facilities-based competition in the short term.
75    
4. Wholesale Competition 
The FCC’s vision of a network of networks does not appear to have materialized 
in the U.S. residential market. For certain sectors of the U.S. enterprise market, however, 
several CLECs have established themselves as pure wholesale providers of local access. 
In its Triennial Review Order, the FCC reported that ‘[t]o a smaller degree, some 
competitive LECs began to provide selected transport services to other competitive LECs 
on a wholesale basis.’
76 Since 1998, CLEC-owned fiber has increased from 100,000 to 
184,000 route miles. In addition, wholesale suppliers of fiber continue to invest in 
                                                 
75 Robert W. Crandall, Allan T. Ingraham, and Hal J. Singer, ‘Do Unbundling Policies 
Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment?’, Topics in Economic Analysis and 
Policy Section,  Berkeley Electronic Journals in Economic Analysis and Policy, 4, 
(2004).   43
facilities that are being used by all carriers.
77 The FCC noted that much of this interoffice 
transport is long-haul intercity, rather than local. In summary, an operating  wholesale 
market appears to have emerged in enterprise switching, transport, and high-speed (DS3) 
loops only according to the FCC analysis. 
5. Other Observations about the Process 
The Telecommunications Act retained the BOCs’ interLATA prohibition while 
establishing, in section 271,
78 a process—involving each state public utilities 
commission, the FCC, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), acting on a state-by-state 
basis—by which the BOCs could earn regulatory approval to enter the interLATA market 
within the regions in which they provide local exchange service. By 2004, the BOCs had 
received section 271 authorizations to provide in-region interLATA service in 48 states 
(long-distance customers in Alaska and Hawaii are not yet served by BOCs) and the 
District of Columbia.
79 For the FCC, BOC entry into the in-region interLATA market has 
been ‘an incentive or reward for opening the local exchange market.’
80 That view 
implicitly subordinates the possible harm to consumers (in the form of delayed price 
reductions) from the restrictions on the BOCs while they seek that carrot.
81  
In an article with Gregory Leonard published in the Antitrust Law Journal, we 
found that the average U.S. consumer received a savings of 8 to 11 percent on the 
monthly interLATA bill in the states where BOC entry occurred as compared to ‘control’ 
states where BOC entry had not occurred. We also found that CLECs gained a substantial 
increase in cumulative share of the local exchange market in states where BOC entry 
occurred as compared to control states without BOC entry. Finally, we found that that 
there was no significant change in the local bill of the average consumer in states where 
BOC entry into interLATA service occurred as compared to those bills in the control 
                                                                                                                                                 
76  See Triennial Review, p. 31 ¶ 37.  
77  BOC UNE Fact Report 2002 pp. III-8 to III-14. 
78  47 U.S.C. § 271.  
79  See FCC, RBOC Applications to Provide In-region, InterLATA Services Under § 271 
(available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/in-region_applications/). 
80  1997 Michigan Section 271 Order, 12 F.C.C. Rcd. Pp. 20,746 ¶ 388. 
81  Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory Leonard, and J. Gregory Sidak, ‘Does Bell Company 
Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?’, Antitrust L.J., 70, 
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states. Thus, the failure of the FCC and the DOJ to consider the tradeoff between 
consumer harm from entry restriction of the BOCs into long distance and the marginal 
gains from further delaying BOC entry by requiring greater regulatory adherence led to 
significant consumer harm in the billions of dollars per year.  We return to the question of 
how consumer interests should enter regulatory deliberation when we examine the 
regulatory experience in New Zealand. 
 
B.  United Kingdom 
Mandatory unbundling in the United Kingdom was first considered by the former 
telecommunications regulator, the Office of Telecommunications (Oftel), in 1996. Oftel 
stated that three facilities-based service providers would be sufficient to provide effective 
competition in the telecommunications market United Kingdom.
82 Oftel acknowledged 
that at least three facilities-based service providers (including British Telecom (BT), a 
cable operator, and a radio access operator) already competed in many U.K. geographic 
markets. Because of the strong level of existing and expected future facilities-based 
competition in the United Kingdom in July 1996, Oftel decided that:  
[a]ny move to allow operators to take over BT exchange lines would undermine past 
investments and jeopardize future plans. Our conclusion, therefore, is that direct connection to 
the BT Access Network would adversely affect the development of competition and would not 
be in the interests of the UK consumer.
83 
In short, Oftel recognized that mandatory unbundling would undermine the goals of 
dynamic efficiency. 
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83Id.,  ¶¶ 46-47. Facilities-based investment by BT’s competitors existed even in the early 
1990s. In particular, ILECs in the United States and Canada invested in U.K. cable 
companies. Those cable companies then began to offer telephone services to their 
customers. Consequently, by January 2004, over 400,000 homes in the U.K. were offered 
telephone service by a cable operator. Id.   45
From 1994 through 1997, regulation shifted in favor of infrastructure competition 
over service competition.
84 In 1996, Oftel became convinced that ‘the key to achieving a 
vibrant market for services provided over telecommunication networks is the promotion 
of fair, efficient and sustainable network competition.’
85 This emphasis of infrastructure 
competition affected Oftel’s treatment of issues such as number portability and equal 
access. The regulatory emphasis shifted back to service competition in 1998 with the 
issuance of several EU directives, which encouraged national regulators not to 
discriminate between firms that were building networks and those that were not. 
In December 1998, Oftel released a consultation document that called for mandatory 
unbundling as a necessary condition for bringing higher bandwidth services to 
consumers.
86 Oftel cited four reasons why mandatory unbundling was needed in the 
United Kingdom. First, BT, which supplied service to 85 percent of U.K. consumers, was 
not equipped in 1998 to provide DSL service. Second, the forthcoming 1999 European 
Union review on telecommunications markets was anticipated to place local loop 
unbundling high on its agenda. Third, the U.K. government had stressed the importance 
of the deployment of new technologies to all consumers. Fourth, other countries, such as 
the United States, had already implemented mandatory unbundling. Although U.K. 
consumers already benefited from platform competition, Oftel felt that mandatory 
unbundling was important for the United Kingdom to maintain its ‘competitive 
advantage’ vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
In November 1999, Oftel announced that unbundled loops and collocation would 
become available to competitive providers.
87 BT was required by July 2001 to allow 
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1996.  
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Dec. 1998 (available at 
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87 Oftel, Access to Bandwidth: Delivering Competition for the Information Age, Nov. 
1999 (available at   46
unbundling and collocation within its network.
88 In its Access to Bandwidth Report, 
Oftel’s provided the following rationale for pursuing mandatory unbundling:  
The best way to achieve the variety of services that consumers want at reasonable prices is to 
promote effective competition in the provision of access to and delivery of these services. In 
examining the case for action, Oftel has considered the level of demand in various segments of 
the market, the supply of products available and whether there are barriers to the competitive 
delivery of higher bandwidth access and services. The conclusion is that regulatory action is 
needed to introduce competition into the upgrade of the local loop.
89 
Oftel intended that mandatory unbundling would lead to enhanced competition in 
broadband services.  Thus, the primary intent of mandatory local loop unbundling in the 
United Kingdom was to expedite the delivery of advanced services to consumers, even 
though regulators conceded that natural market forces might provide competitive 
offerings within a reasonable period of time. 
1. Retail Competition 
a. Pricing 
One rationale for mandatory unbundling is increased competition in retail 
services, which is characterized by lower retail prices.
90 Pricing data from Oftel indicate 
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172-174. Along with the requirement of mandatory unbundling, the Director General of 
Telecommunications (DGT) permitted that rates for mandatory unbundling should (1) 
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89 See Oftel Access to Bandwidth 1999, ¶ 2.4. 
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increased productivity with resulting benefits in terms of lower prices and better quality 
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that mandatory unbundling, which was implemented in the United Kingdom in the 
middle of 2001, has not measurably decreased prices of telecommunications service. 
According to Oftel, from 1996 through the middle of 2001, the time at which BT was 
required to begin unbundling, prices for residential service decreased by approximately 
20 percent.
91 In contrast, prices for residential service slightly increased after BT was 
required to unbundle.
92 Similarly, the price of telecommunications service for businesses 
decreased by 40 percent between 1996 and mid-2001, but it has not declined measurably 
since mandatory unbundling was implemented. Only a few carriers have actually 
providing or were attempting to provide local telephone service via unbundled access.  
Although UNE-based competition for residential voice customers has not 
flourished in the United Kingdom, CLECs have provided broadband Internet service 
extensively through unbundled access. As of July 2003, entrants providing broadband 
service through unbundled access increased their DSL lines to over 536,000, which 
nearly equaled the total DSL customers of BT.
93 Almost all of these new entrants 
provided high-speed Internet service, as only 3,500 of the new entrants’ 536,000 
unbundled lines were used to provide both voice and data service. 
Retail competition in broadband services is intense and prices have been 
decreasing. Mandatory unbundling may not be the cause of the price decline. Facilities-
based cable operator ntl launched the first U.K broadband offering in April 1999, 
followed by Telewest in March 2000. Although BT did not launch its first DSL offering 
until mid-2000, owing to technical problems, lines were not widely available until May 
2001. The launch of retail DSL products by BT and various third parties (via BT’s 
wholesale offer) began a period of intense price competition between broadband 
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91  Oftel, The UK Telecommunications Industry Market Information: 2001/02, Mar. 
2003, p. 7 (available at 
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2003/ami0303.pdf).  
92 Residential access lines in the UK were not subsidized to the extent found in the US.  
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93  Commission of the European Communities, Ninth Report from the Commission on the 
Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package: European Telecoms 
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providers. By the middle of 2003, price reductions had transformed the U.K. broadband 
market from one of the most expensive in the OECD to the cheapest, as observed in 
Oftel’s survey of the broadband market.
94 Hence, price decreases in the U.K. market can 
be directly linked to competition between DSL and cable providers.
95 In the months after 
the launch of BT’s DSL service, ntl and Telewest responded with significant price 
reductions, such that, by mid-2001, prices were around 50 percent of their launch levels. 
BT responded in March 2003 with a 25 percent price reduction, which provided the 
trigger for a series of price cuts by other ISPs using BT’s resale service. 
b. Investment 
Another rationale for mandatory unbundling is the expectation that it will increase 
the ILEC’s incentive to upgrade its network. Table 3 lists BT’s investment in fixed 
capital assets for its fiscal years ending in March between 1996 and 2003. 
 
TABLE 3: BT INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL ASSETS: FISCAL YEARS 1996-2003 
 












Source: BT, Annual Report and Form 20-F 2003 at 27 (released 2003) available at: 
http://www.btplc.com/report/report03/index.htm; BT, Annual Report and Form 20-F 2000 at 26 (Released March 2000) 
available at: 
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The data in Table 3 indicate that in its fiscal year 1999, BT spent £1.8 billion on fixed-
capital investment. During 2000, BT spent £5.8 billon on fixed capital investment,
96 and 
in 2001 BT spent £5.2 billion on fixed capital investment. In fiscal year 2002, BT 
reduced its investment to £1.2 billion, and in fiscal year 2003,
 BT spent only £555 million 
on fixed capital investment. Hence, BT’s investment in fixed capital assets reached its 
apex at the end of fiscal year 2001, which ended in March 2001, before mandatory 
unbundling was introduced in the United Kingdom. Of course, the end of BT’s fiscal year 
2001 coincided almost perfectly with the bursting of the ‘telecommunications bubble,’ 
which likely contributed, at least in part, to the decrease in BT’s investment. 
BT’s pattern of investment corresponds closely with the pattern of investment by 
the entire U.K. telecommunications industry. From 1994 through 2000, 
telecommunications investment in the United Kingdom increased substantially. 
Approximately £4 billion was invested by the telecommunications industry in 1994, 
accounting for 4 percent of total investment in the United Kingdom that year.
97 By 2000, 
nearly £12 billion was invested by the telecommunications industry. Between 2000 and 
2001, telecommunications investment in the United Kingdom fell by approximately £4 
billion.  
2. Entry Barriers 
Mandatory unbundling is considered necessary whenever market forces cannot be 
relied upon to produce facilities-based competition. An analysis of platform competition 
for broadband services in the United Kingdom, however, reveals that entry unrelated to 
unbundling currently exists. As of July 2003, BT operated over 563,000 DSL lines in the 
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United Kingdom,
98 while cable operators served nearly 1.1 million customers. Given the 
nearly two-to-one advantage of cable modem service to BT’s DSL service in the United 
Kingdom, it is not reasonable to presume that BT has market power in the broadband 
Internet services market, especially in those geographic markets passed by cable 
networks.  
Cable operators ntl and Telewest also compete vigorously with BT for residential 
and business voice customers.
99 U.K. cable companies have offered residential telephone 
service for nearly a decade. When the cable companies first deployed coaxial cable for 
television services, they simultaneously laid regular copper phone lines in the same 
trenches.  
Cable telephony’s share of fixed voice connections has steadily increased over 
time. In March 1998, cable operators ntl and Telewest provided telephone service to 9.1 
percent of residential customers.
100 By December 2003, their combined share of the 
residential voice market had increased to 16.6 percent.
101 Hence, in households passed by 
cable networks, cable operators have roughly 33 percent of fixed-line voice 
connections.
102 The increase in the cable companies’ share of residential voice services in 
the United Kingdom came largely at the expense of BT, whose share fell from 86.2 
percent to 82.7 percent between March 1998 and December 2003.
103  
                                                 
98 See EU Ninth Report.  
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extremely competitive satellite provider (SkyB) which controls football (soccer) telecasts 
in the UK, which provides a significant competitive advantage. 
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101.Ofcom, Ofcom Fixed Telecoms Market Information Update, May 2004, at tbl. 7 
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Cable companies’ share of business voice service revenues in the United Kingdom has 
also increased. Between 1996 and 1997, ntl and Telewest controlled only 2.6 percent of 
business voice revenues, but by December 2003 those companies had acquired a 4.8 
percent share.
104 Cable’s share of business voice revenues is smaller than its share of 
residential voice revenues because cable operators must compete with several other 
facilities-based CLECs, including Colt Telecom Group (COLT), in the business sector.  
COLT, which has operations in 32 cities in 13 European countries, competes directly 
with BT and cable operators for business customers. COLT established its metropolitan 
area network in London in 1993.
105 It expanded its network to include Birmingham in 
December 2000 and Manchester in February 2002. The COLT network is largely 
deployed on COLT’s fully owned fiber, which when supplemented with current 
hardware, can reach multi-gigabit speeds on a single circuit. COLT targets its services to 
business users (‘COLT interAccess’) and resellers of Internet access (‘COLT 
InterTransit’). COLT also offers its business customers a full range of voice services. 
Fidelity Investments owns 56 percent of COLT. COLT expected to spend between £150 
million and £200 million in capital expenditure in 2004, depending on customer 
demand.
106 As of March 2004, COLT reported having over 17,000 business customers 
across Europe.
107 
BT’s share of both residential and business voice revenues has decreased 
significantly since 1993. BT’s share of residential voice revenues, which was nearly 100 
percent in 1993, declined steadily to just below 70 percent in 2001.
108 Since 2001, when 
BT was required to unbundle the local loop, BT’s share of residential revenues has 
remained constant at 70 percent. In 1993, BT controlled approximately 85 percent of the 
voice revenues in the business sector. That share, however, had steadily declined to 
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below 60 percent by 2001. By 2003, BT’s share of business voice revenues had decreased 
to approximately 52 percent.  
3. Stepping Stone Hypothesis 
As of 2005, it was not apparent that new entrants in the United Kingdom had used 
unbundled loops to evolve into facilities-based competitors. A lack of conversion from 
unbundled access to facilities-based service is likely due to the high level of facilities-
based investment that already occurred before unbundling was mandated. In particular, 
entrants controlled 24.0 percent of the revenues for residential voice services by March 
2001, and 39.5 percent of the business revenues from voice services by March 2001.
 109 
The high level of facilities-based competition that predated the decision-making process 
for local loop unbundling raises serious issues as to whether mandatory unbundling was 
even needed for voice or broadband services in the United Kingdom by the time that 
Oftel mandated it in November 1999.  
4. Wholesale Competition 
A final rationale for mandatory unbundling is increased competition in the 
wholesale market, which is typically characterized by supply of alternative networks by 
CLECs for new entrants. The size of the wholesale market in the United Kingdom has 
grown considerably since the mid 1990s. Between 1996 and 2002, the wholesale market 
for voice services in the United Kingdom increased from £1.9 billion to £4.5 billion—a 
130 percent increase. By March 2002, the largest share of the wholesale voice market, 
approximately 49.1 percent, was controlled by BT. Cable operators ntl, Telewest, and 
Cable & Wireless controlled approximately 19.9 percent of the wholesale voice revenues 
in the United Kingdom. The remaining 31 percent of the market was controlled by ‘other 
operators.’ Business districts in most major cities and towns in the United Kingdom are 
served by facilities-based CLECs. These CLECs typically offer service to both business 
customers and CLECs for resale.  
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5. Other Observations About the Process 
The industry structure facing U.K regulators was unique in the sense that competition 
from cable telephony emerged before mandatory local loop unbundling was ordered, let 
alone implemented. Cable operators have opposed mandatory unbundling on the grounds 
that it would not encourage facilities-based competitors to expand into rural areas. For 
example, Telewest stated in February 2000: 
[W]e do not believe that local loop unbundling will deliver the necessary universal broadband 
upgrades that Government policies require. It may purely delay the dominant player from full 
broadband upgrade of its local infrastructure (assuming that ADSL over twisted copper pair is 
only an interim solution) and deter alternative local loop investors from further substantial build, 
particularly to the lower density areas.
110 
Telewest argued, correctly, that CLECs that rely on unbundled access were likely to 
focus their activities in densely populated markets. 
Although the cable companies in the United Kingdom have begun to offer 
broadband Internet and voice service to their existing base of customers, only 50 percent 
of the homes in the United Kingdom were passed by the cable network as of July 2003.
111 
This lack of coverage explains in part why cable television accounted for only 26.4 
percent of the multichannel television market in the United Kingdom as of 2003. Satellite 
television is much stronger in the United Kingdom than in the United States, as BskyB 
controls much of the sports content that cable operators cannot provide. It might be 
tempting for regulators to consider the cable industry’s investment in broadband and 
telephony in cables’ existing footprint as a sunk investment, which cannot be reversed 
through mandatory unbundling of BT’s local loops. But mandatory unbundling of BT’s 
network in rural areas might indirectly decrease the incentive of the cable operators to 
expand into rural areas, as UNE-based CLECs could enter those rural areas through 
unbundling at a lower cost. Cable operator Telewest succinctly explained the fallacy of 
the regulator’s decision-making when it declared: ‘[I]f demand [for unbundled access] 
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really exists, the market will deliver access products for new broadband services without 
regulatory intervention.’
112 Figure 5 shows the percent of homes passed by a cable 
operator in the United Kingdom between 1990 and 2003. 
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Source: Peter Humphreys, Radio and Television Systems in Great Britain, Spring 1999 (available at 
http://www.obs.coe.int/oea_publ/hbi/HBI2K_GB.html); Teldok, Teldok Yearbook 1997, 24 July  1997, at 245; Martyn 
Williams, TS News-UK Market Roundup, 4 December 1996; OFCOM, ITC Multi-Channel Quarterly-Q3 2002, 17 
December 2002, at 7; OFCOM, ITC Multi-Channel Quarterly-Q2 2003, June 2003, at 7. 
The deployment of any new technology typically follows an ‘S-curve.’ Initially, 
technology penetration increases at an increasing rate. After some critical point, the 
technology is deployed at a diminishing rate until the entire market is saturated. Until 
1999, cable penetration in the United Kingdom followed a deployment schedule similar 
to that suggested by the S-curve. In particular, cable penetration rapidly increased from 
only 6.2 percent in 1990 to 50 percent by 1999. Since 1999, however, cable penetration 
has increased by only 1.8 percent. The slow deployment of cable services to new markets 
in the United Kingdom could be explained, in part, by the introduction of mandatory 
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unbundling of BT’s network. If this effect is present, consumers have been injured by the 
decrease in competition to BSkyB. Hence, Ofcom’s policy has led to greater market 
power for a company that Ofcom recognizes is exercising market power.
113  Again, the 
regulator in the United Kingdom as in the United States did not do an analysis of the 
effect of its regulatory policy on consumer welfare. 
  As late as mid-2005, Ofcom believed that it was necessary to resort to greater 
levels of regulatory intervention to make unbundling work. In June 2005, Ofcom stated 
that “years of intrusive regulation have not created the conditions for the sustainable 
competition necessary for long-term consumer benefit and which, in other countries, has 
spurred investment in next generation core and access networks.”
114 Ofcom’s 
fundamental concern was that some assets were supposedly economically impossible to 
replicate, which created an “enduring bottleneck,” especially in the access part of the 
network. Ofcom rejected the option of recommending a Competition Commission 
investigation, which could have led to the break-up of BT, and it instead opened a public 
consultation on the proposal to accept a series of solutions offered by BT.
115 
In November 2004, Ofcom opened the Phase 2 consultation of its Strategic 
Review of Telecommunications.
116 The review noted that the fixed line market in the 
United Kingdom has remained fragmented and that BT was larger than most of its 
competitors combined, in terms of revenues, market capitalization, and investment. The 
review argued that the economies of scale and sunk costs for fixed networks are 
especially difficult for entrants to overcome, which made them reliant on BT to provide 
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wholesale access to the network. Ofcom stated that the result of this reliance on BT was 
slow product development, inferior wholesale products, poor transactional processes, and 
a general lack of transparency, which combined to create an unattractive market for 
competition. 
  Ofcom offered three potential courses of action in its November 2004 review. The 
first option involved across-the-board deregulation and complete reliance on competition 
law to constrain BT’s purported market power. The second option was to make a 
reference to the Competition Commission under the Enterprise Act of 2002, which would 
actively consider the structural separation of BT. The third option was to seek from BT 
“real equality of access,” which consisted of two parts.
117 The first part would require 
“BT’s own downstream operations use the same products, processes, and prices as those 
used by their retail rivals.” The second part would require “operational separation within 
BT that would ensure that those responsible for overseeing BT’s bottleneck assets had 
real incentives to wish to serve other operators in practice and on the ground with the 
same zeal, efficiency and enthusiasm as they served the remainder of BT’s downstream 
activities.” BT chose Ofcom’s third option. 
  BT responded to Ofcom’s November 2004 review in February 2005 by 
announcing a “comprehensive set of proposals to stimulate the UK telecoms industry.”
118 
The proposals announced in February 2005 formed the basis for the proposed regulatory 
settlement with Ofcom, which was formally proposed by BT in June 2005.
119 In response 
to BT’s proposal, Ofcom opened a public consultation to elicit comments on BT’s 
solutions.
120 
  The most significant of BT’s proposed undertakings was the creation of a new 
business unit within BT, provisionally named the Access Services Division (ASD), which 
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would provide equal access to its nationwide network. The ASD would provide, on 
behalf of BT, wholesale line rental, local loop unbundling, wholesale extension service, 
partial private circuits, backhaul extension service, and various other products. The ASD 
would not provide any service to BT unless it also offered that product to BT’s 
competitors on an “equivalence of input” basis, which would include the same 
timeframes, terms, conditions, and prices. The ASD would have its own staff of 
approximately 30,000 employees, and it would have a distinct brand name.
121 
A significant part of the agreement between BT and Ofcom is the creation of an 
internal, five-member “Equality of Access Board,” supported by an “Equality of Access 
Office,” to monitor the company’s compliance with its “Undertakings” agreement and to 
recommend remedial action to BT’s management.
122 Three members of the Board would 
be “independent,” meaning that BT would select them with Ofcom’s advice and consent. 
Ofcom would receive minutes of the proceedings of the Equality of Access Board, as 
well are regular reports. The Equality of Access Board “may suggest to BT remedial 
action to ensure compliance with these Undertakings,” and “BT shall take due account of 
any suggestions or comments the [Equality of Access Board] may have.” The Equality of 
Access Board “shall inform Ofcom, within ten working days, when it comes to its 
attention that there has been a non-trivial breach of these Undertakings.” BT is required 
to fund and staff this internal oversight activity satisfactorily: “BT shall ensure that the 
[Equality of Access Office] is resourced commensurate with the demands placed upon it 
and is able to operate with the level of independence required.” The Equality of Access 
Board would have access to information held anywhere in or by BT that the Board 
deemed that “it needs to fulfill its role,” and, in a curiously worded provision, the Board 
“shall determine how best to engage with representatives of industry in order to 
understand their issues and concerns.”  
This arrangement underscores that decisions concerning network access implicate 
both ownership and control of the incumbent firm. One way to view BT’s undertaking 
with Ofcom is that the regulator’s indirect majority participation in the governance of the 
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ASD eliminates detailed ex ante regulation of wholesale services. Nonetheless, the risks 
of ownership (including the financial risk inherent in making sunk investments in 
network infrastructure) would remain with BT’s shareholders. Perhaps this hybrid re-
nationalization of BT’s access network will purchase regulatory relief for its retail 
business. But there is reason for skepticism, given the familiar tendency of regulators to 
perpetuate (and even initiate) intervention in markets that have become demonstrably 
competitive.  Further, the UK government’s previous record with a somewhat similar 
plan for the railroads ended in financial disaster in 2001 because the regulator would not 
permit the network provider to set rates high enough for continued investment and 
modernization of the rail network.
123 
As of 2006 it appears that the UK insistence on “equality of access” may lead to 
BT not investing in either a “fiber to the home network” as Verizon is currently doing in 
the US or in a “fiber to the node” network as AT&T (SBC) is currently doing.  Given the 
current technology both of these forms of fiber networks do not permit “equality of 
access” to competitors.  While the US ILEC investments are risky and may not succeed 
economically, the UK regulatory policy may well lead to a significant distortion in 
technology choice and future competition among pay-TV providers compared to likely 
outcomes in the US, Australia, Canada, and a number of other advanced economies. 
 
C. New Zealand 
Deregulation of the telecommunications industry in New Zealand began in April 
1989 with the separation of Telecom Corporation (Telecom) from New Zealand Post 
Office.
124 Telecom became fully privatized in 1990. In accordance with New Zealand’s 
Commerce Act of 1986 and the Fair Trading Act of 1986, Telecom was declared 
‘dominant’ in the telecommunications market. As a result, the regulator placed certain 
constraints on Telecom, but ‘reaffirmed its reliance on general competition law to 
achieve its objective in telecommunications.’  
                                                 
123 Hausman and Myers (2002) discuss the railroad network financial disaster in the UK.  
124  New Zealand Telecommunications 1987-2001, Publication No. 8, ¶¶ 8-9 (August 
2001) [New Zealand Pub. No. 8].   59
Unlike many other countries, New Zealand did not adopt any sector-specific 
regulation.
125 Section 64 of the Telecommunications Act of 2001 required the Commerce 
Commission (CC) to determine the necessity of regulating access to the unbundled 
elements of Telecom’s local loop network and fixed public data network.
126 The CC 
initially set resale discounts as specified in the Telecom Act of 2001. In December 2003, 
the CC recommended in its Final Report against unbundling local loops, line sharing, and 
unbundling ‘elements of Telecom’s fixed Public Data Network beyond those supporting 
the Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) bitstream services.’ 
To measure the efficacy of full local loop unbundling, the CC used a cost-benefit 
analysis that measured the changes in total surplus (consumer and producer surplus) 
relative to the status quo of no regulation. The New Zealand CC uses the “Long Term 
Benefits to End-Users” (LTBE) criteria in determining its regulatory policies.  This 
determination usually involves an explicit cost-benefit analysis.
127  To the extent that 
mandatory unbundling reduces prices in the short term, consumer welfare increases. The 
increase in consumer welfare due to an expansion in output is referred to an “allocative 
efficiency” gain. The CC also considered the “wealth transfer” from producers to 
consumers when prices decline, which occurs independent of output expansion. Although 
the CC found short run gains in welfare, the calculations were subject to considerable 
uncertainty and criticism, and did not take account of effects on investment by the 
incumbent. Although it recognized the potential importance of dynamic efficiency, the 
CC believed that there was no robust method of quantifying dynamic efficiency gains 
that were applicable to its decision.  
The CC ultimately elected not to adopt local loop unbundling and listed several 
reasons in support of its decision. First, the CC noted that platform competition, 
especially in the form of fixed wireless networks, was likely to ‘evolve and reduce the 
                                                 
125 See, e.g., Geradin & Kerf, p.119 (explaining how the New Zealand adopted the 
opposite approach of the United States, where sector-specific regulation was pervasive).  
126 Telecommunications Act 2001 Section 64 Review and Schedule 3 Investigation into 
Unbundling the Local Loop Network and the Fixed Public Data Network, Final Report, 9 
December 2003, p. i [CC Final Report]. 
127  Australia uses a similar approach.  The ACCC calls its test the “Long Term Interest of 
end-users” (LTIE) approach.  Australia and New Zealand are the two regulatory bodies 
that use an explicite economic approach to determination of regulation.   60
extent of [Telecom’s] bottleneck over time.’ Second, the CC explained that the potential 
for dynamic efficiency gains from local loop unbundling was tempered by international 
experience, noting that ‘in a significant number of countries, the gains from local loop 
unbundling have been disappointing.’ Third, the CC revealed that responses to its draft 
report indicated ‘fairly limited demand for local loops’ as the preferred means of 
competitive entry. Fourth, the CC explained that mandatory unbundling was ‘a resource 
intensive activity,’ which generated ‘a significant level of controversy in determining 
terms of access to unbundled loops in overseas jurisdictions.’ Most importantly, the CC 
determined the economic incentives for the incumbent to invest in new services would be 
significantly decreased and that these new services could lead to very large welfare gains 
to consumers. 
Instead of mandatory unbundling, the CC ‘recommended’ access to Telecom’s 
ADSL service for residential and small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), along with 
the associated backhaul transmission services and operational support systems (OSSs). 
With the exception of updating the ‘Kiwi Share,’ which imposes universal service 
obligations on Telecom and establishes a price ceiling for its residential calls,
128 the result 
of the CC’s recommendations was a largely unregulated telecommunications market 
relative to most European countries and the United States.  
1. Retail Competition 
In this section, we examine the recent trends in investment and pricing in New 
Zealand. The New Zealand survey provides a potential counterfactual to the unbundling 
experience in other countries.  
                                                 
128 Government Announces Updated Kiwi Share Obligation (available at 
http://www.med.govt.nz/pbt/telecom/minister20011218b.html); Determination for TSO 
Instrument for Local Residential Service for period between 20 December 2001 and 30 
June 2002 p.11 (available at 
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/telecommunications/obligations/FinalDetermination17Dec2
002.PDF). Among other requirements, Telecom is required to provide (1) a monthly line 
rental no higher than the CPI adjusted price of the residential line rental charged at 1 
November 1989 and (2) free local calling.   61
a. Pricing 
Despite the fact that the CC has abstained from mandatory unbundling, prices for 
telecommunications services in New Zealand have not increased substantially. Figure 6 
shows the prices for telephone rental and connection and telephone call charges in New 
Zealand since June 1999.  However, to a large extent this outcome is influenced by the 
“Kiwi Share Obligation” which permits New Zealand Telecom to only increase 
residential monthly access charges at the rate of inflation, although no regulatory 
restriction is placed on business access charges. 
 
Figure 6: Statistics New Zealand’s Real Residential Telephone Service Price Index: 
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Source: Statistics New Zealand (available by request at  http://www.stats.govt.nz/). 
As Figure 6 shows, telephone rental and connection charges offered by all carriers in 
New Zealand consistently decreased from June 1999 to December 2001. From March 
2003 through March 2004, telephone rental and connection charges have increased by a 
modest 2.5 percent. Similarly, the price for telephone call charges has remained flat over 
the past few years. According to Statistics New Zealand, prices for residential telephone   62
service decreased by an average of 3.5 percent per year between 1991 and 2001.
129 One 
possible explanation for the decline in prices in the absence of mandatory unbundling is 
that TelstraClear and other facilities-based rivals compete with Telecom in urban areas.
130 
b. Investment 
As of June 2003, Telecom had decreased its capital expenditure by over 60 
percent since 2001.
131 The decline in Telecom’s investment may be attributable to the 
rapid decline in telecommunications prices and the general decline of the global 
telecommunications market. The decline in Telecom’s rate of investment is potentially 
misleading, however, because Telecom increased its investment in the late 1990s. In 
particular, Telecom introduced high-speed Internet access in 1999 with the roll out of 
Jetstream, which is based on ADSL technology.
132 In 2000, following the development of 
Jetstream, Telecom connected New Zealand’s North and South Islands using a submarine 
cable, with an estimated investment of NZ$38 million. The submarine cable allows 98 
percent of New Zealand’s population to access Telecom’s wireless network. Telecom 
also introduced voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) in 2000.
133 Telecom offers VoIP to 
business customers, which is a fully managed service that includes extensive IP services 
and is the base for their next generation network (NGN), which is currently being 
developed and will gradually be rolled out over the next ten years.
134 Telecom’s NGN is 
comprised of ‘a single network that delivers multiple applications (voice, data, video) to 
                                                 
129 See New Zealand Pub. No. 8, pp. 22-23. 
130 TelstraClear’s network was established before TelstraSaturn bought Clear 
Communications in 2001. TelstraSaturn and Clear separately invested in fiber optic 
networks in New Zealand.  
131 Telecom New Zealand Annual Report for the Year Ended 30 June 2003, p. 4 
(available at http://www.telecom.co.nz/binarys/annual_report_2003.pdf) 
132 TelstraClear Company Information (available at 
http://www.telecom.co.nz/content/0,3900,200633-1548,00.html) [TelstraClear 
Information] 
133NetIQ Case Study, Telecom New Zealand Prepares for IP Telephony with NetIQ’s 
Vivinet Manager, 2003 (available at http://www.netiq.com/products/vm/whitepapers.asp). 
134See Telecom New Zealand’s website 
(http://www.telecom.co.nz/content/0,3900,202900-201383,00.html); TelstraClear, 
Telecom NZ Next Generation Network Regulatory Issues raised by NGN Deployment, 
Conference on Commerce Commission Draft Report 10-14 November 2003, p. 5 
(available at http://www.comcom.govt.nz/telecommunications/llu/Conf/tclngn.PDF)   63
multiple devices, whether fixed or mobile.’
135 In addition to the development of the 
NGN, Telecom has begun to roll out its 3G wireless services. 
Perhaps more importantly, Telecom is rolling out video services over ADSL, 
which will lead to large benefits to New Zealand consumers.
136  Fearing Telecom would 
slow its investment in video capabilities, the CC gave TelstraClear low grade (128K) 
bitstream in lieu of full loop unbundling. The main competition for Telecom’s video 
service is satellite television, as cable television penetration in New Zealand is lacking 
(except in Wellington). Soon, Telecom will have the ‘triple play’ of voice, broadband, 
and television over a single network. It is noteworthy that New Zealand is in the forefront 
of video over the fixed-access network.  
2. Entry Barriers 
As of early 2004, facilities-based competition was well underway in New 
Zealand. TelstraClear represents the most significant facilities-based competitor to 
Telecom. TelstraClear invested over $1 billion in New Zealand through 2002, with an 
additional investment of approximately $200 million in 2003.
137 By June 2002, 
TelstraClear had acquired a 7 percent share of all fixed-access voice connections.
138 
TelstraClear, which owns Clear Net and Paradise.net, and other entrants had acquired 28 
percent of the residential broadband market by June 2003. 
Before the purchase of Clear Communications by TelstraSaturn and Austar in 
December 2001 (which formed TelstraClear), both Clear and TelstraSaturn independently 
invested millions of dollars to establish their own fiber-optic networks.
139 Since the 
acquisition, TelstraClear has been developing a nationwide network in New Zealand to 
provide telephone, data, Internet, mobile, and cable television services.
140 TelstraClear 
                                                 
135. Murray Milner and Vince Pizzica, ‘Telecom New Zealand: Pragmatic Evolution to 
Next Generation Networks’, Alcatel , 22 April 2003. 
136. See Jerry Hausman, Analysis of OXERA Cost Benefit Analysis (Conference 
Presentation), 11 November 2003, p. 5.  
137 New Zealand Commerce Commission, 4th Annual New Zealand Telecommunications 
& ICT Summit, 25 June 2003, pp. 2-3. [4th Summit] 
138. See New Zealand Profile, p.  27. 
139  See 4th Summit, p. 14. 
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plans to spend NZ$14 million to roll out its network in nine cities.
141 In January 2002, 
TelstraClear proposed the construction of an overhead network with underground 
connections in Auckland, which will provide direct competition to Telecom’s network.
142 
During the Section 64 Review proceeding in 2003, TelstraClear claimed that it had 
determined not to continue rolling out its network because it was too expensive.
143 Such 
claims seem implausible in light of the fact that Telstra is the largest Australian company 
and paid its shareholders an interim dividend of A$1.6 billion in April 2004.
144 Thus, our 
hypothesis that mandatory unbundling undermines the incentive of CLECs to invest in 
their own facilities seems to hold. While the CC did not mandate unbundling it did 
mandate bitstream sharing for DSL and TelstraClear has not increased its network 
coverage (except marginally) in the last three years. Another significant facilities-based 
rival in New Zealand is Countries Power, which rolled out a fiber optic and radio network 
on May 8, 2003.
145 The project, called Wired Country, provides high speed Internet and 
telephone services to business and residential customers in the Franklin and Papakura 
regions of New Zealand.
146 
Fixed wireless access (FWA) providers represent yet another source of facilities-
based competition. In its decision not to require unbundling, the CC noted the potential 
for fixed wireless to constrain Telecom’s local telephone prices: 
The Commission notes the potential for Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) to evolve and reduce the 
extent of this bottleneck over time, although the Commission has reservations over the technical 
capacity of FWA to be a substitute for services that can run over the local loop network. FWA is 
                                                 
141  See New Zealand Profile, p. 19. 
142 TelstraClear Application: Area 3 Rollout Assessment of Environmental Effects, Jan. 
2002, p. 3 (available at http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/network_proposal.pdf). 
143  See New Zealand Profile, p. 14: “Over a year ago [TelstraClear] basically abandoned 
the roll out of any new fixed infrastructure themselves and their future now depends on 
utilising TNZ’s national network wherever it can.” 
144  Telstra Press Release, Telstra pays shareholders interim dividend of $1.6 billion, 29 
April 2004 (available at 
http://www.telstra.com.au/communications/shareholder/docs/tls225_interimdividend.pdf)
. Telstra has announced a total expected payout of over A$4 billion over the next few 
years. 
145 See 4th Summit, pp. 2-3. 
146 Counties Power Gets Totally Wired, Axon, October 2003 (available at 
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likely to evolve over time in terms of its capacity and its ability to substitute for services that run 
over the local loop network, although the timing and nature of this evolution is uncertain.
147 
The CC’s inclusion of fixed wireless in the relevant product market is notably at odds 
with the position of the U.S. FCC, which has argued that FWA is not a suitable substitute 
for the fixed copper network.
148 
Beginning in 1999, Woosh Wireless (formerly Walker Wireless) began rolling out 
a national FWA network to compete with Telecom’s fixed-access network.
149 Woosh 
competes with Telecom in voice and data services by targeting residential and business 
customers. As of May 2004, deployment of Woosh’s network was underway in Auckland 
and Southland, and was expected to continue in Wairarapa, Northland, Canterbury, and 
other major markets in late 2004.
150 In addition to Woosh, other FWA providers, such as 
Broadcast Communications Limited (BCL), are investing in FWA technology intended to 
compete with Telecom. For example, BCL is rolling out a FWA network that covers rural 
and provincial areas in New Zealand.
151  
Telecom regards Woosh and other FWA providers as competitors in the local 
telephone services market. According to a Telecom study, if Woosh were able to capture 
10 percent of the local market covered by its roll-out, then Woosh would be able to 
undercut Telecom’s prices by 22 percent.
152 As Woosh and other CLECs increase their 
geographic scope, they will be able to exert further pricing pressure on Telecom.
153 
Facilities-based entrants argue that mandatory unbundling would hinder the 
introduction and development of new technologies that compete with Telecom’s local 
loops. In particular, those CLECs explain that mandatory unbundling will make raising 
investment capital increasingly difficult. They also point out that mandatory unbundling 
would reduce the price at which competitive fixed-line services could be offered, thereby 
undermining the return on their investment.  
                                                 
147 See CC Final Report, p. 196 ¶ 788.  
148 See Triennial Review, p.  141 ¶ 231  
149 See CC Final Report, p.  91 ¶¶ 368-370. 
150 Whoosh Wireless, About Us, (available at 
http://www.woosh.com/UserInterface/Woosh/ Static/WhoisWoosh/WhoisWoosh.aspx). 
151 See CC Final Report, p. 95, ¶ 392. 
152 Telecom’s Response to the Commission’s Draft Report, 29 October 2003, p.  55.  
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3. Stepping Stone Hypothesis 
The stepping-stone hypothesis implies that after initial entry into the market 
through the use of a competitor’s lines, CLECs will eventually invest in construction of 
their own network. The New Zealand government accepted the CC’s recommendation on 
mandatory unbundling.
154 Hence, the stepping stone hypothesis was never put to the test 
in New Zealand. 
 
4. Wholesale Competition 
We are not aware of any evidence that facilities-based entrants are providing 
wholesale access to new entrants in New Zealand. As of December 2003, the CC 
characterized the wholesale markets for local loops, bitstream access, fixed public data 
network (PDN) services, and backhaul services as ‘limited,’ with the exception of 
wholesale competition in certain central business districts. Given the nature of the supply 
of and demand for switching, transport, and high-capacity loops serving business 
customers, however, we expect that the development of a wholesale market in New 
Zealand should be no different from the U.S. experience. 
 
5. Other Observations about the Process 
New Zealand is unique among the countries  we discuss in that the CC used the 
appropriate social-welfare framework—namely, the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus—to assess various regulatory policies. Most regulators, including the U.S. FCC, 
have embraced a competitor-welfare framework when formulating telecommunications 
policy. Perhaps more remarkable, the CC considered dynamic efficiency in addition to 
static efficiency when evaluating alternatives, and defined the former as ‘how well the 
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2004 (available at 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19750) (explaining that 
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competitive process works: how well the market ultimately responds to the demands of 
end-users over time, by changes to what is produced and how it is produced.’ The CC 
concluded that (negative) dynamic efficiency effects of unbundling could potentially 
exceed (positive) static effects: 
The general point, though, is that regulation imposes risks on investors and can potentially 
hamper investment and, as a consequence, innovation. Regulation may mean that firms with 
access to Telecom’s local loop network or fixed PDN may have access to the benefits of an 
upgraded network without taking associated risks, which are borne by the owner of the network. 
Regulated firms may be reluctant to invest when competing firms have access to some of the 
rents provided by their assets. A risk for the regulated firm is that entrants may ‘cherry pick’ 
markets, without committing to the market in the same way as the incumbent has. The 
importance of these possibilities would depend on the extent of unbundling and the behaviour of 
access-seekers. 
As other countries are considering whether to mandate unbundling, the CC’s framework 
for analysis provides a different point of view in that it was more explicitly economic in 
focus. 
  However, in 2006 the majority party in New Zealand decided to overrule the CC 
and require mandatory local loop unbundling of Telecom’s copper network using 
TSLRIC pricing principles in New Zealand.
155  While the final outcome of the process is 
not definite, it currently appears that the government will not require telecom to be 
structurally separate into wholesale and retail segments.  However, it does appear likely 
                                                 
155 Since New Zealand has a parliamentary form of government, this new policy direction 
will be adopted.  The major reason for the change in policy is the relatively low level of 
broadband penetration in New Zealand compared to other countries with comparable 
income levels.  However, New Zealand is the only country outside of North America and 
Hong Kong with free residential calling which makes narrowband internet access “free” 
on a per call basis and which makes broadband internet access relatively more expensive 
than in other countries that have telephone charge on either a per call (e.g. Australia) or 
per minute (e.g. most EU countries) basis.  Thus, the effect on broadband access of this 
relative price difference would need to be analyzed to determine what amount of the New 
Zealand broadband “shortfall” arises from this feature of telecom regulation that requires 
free residential calls in New Zealand.   68
that the regulatory basis for the wholesale price of bitstream access will change from 
retail minus to a cost-based approach, as with mandatory unbundling.
156   
 
VI. The End of Regulation? 
  We believe, consistent with the public pronouncements of most regulators, that 
the end point of the current regulatory process should be facilities-based competition.  As 
we discussed in the beginning of this paper regulation sets prices based only on costs, 
which cannot be the correct approach when competition exists together with technologies 
that exhibit important fixed costs (economies of scale) and economies of scope, and that 
require large sunk cost investments.  Further, we believe that the former “natural 
monopoly” justification for a single network has been demonstrated to no longer hold 
given the success of cable networks in providing both broadband internet and residential 
voice service in both the United States and the United  Kingdom.  Also, the increasing 
use of cellular telephony and other wireless technology such as fixed wireless, WiFi, and 
in the future WiMax provides additional competition to the landline network.
157  While 
regulators such as the FCC have been very slow to take account of competition, scrutiny 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has forced the FCC to moderate its 
approach.  Indeed, in August 2005 the FCC voted to deregulate ILEC provision of 
broadband Internet service, DSL, so that it need no longer be unbundled after a one-year 
transition period.  Thus, the FCC has retreated from its mandatory sharing approach and 
recognized the competitive reality that cable networks have approximately a 60% share 
of broadband Internet demand. 
We first consider the question: Will landline service in the United States continue 
to be regulated, or will we see “The End of Regulation”?  Telecommunications 
regulators, along with many antitrust authorities, are sometimes fixated by market share 
                                                 
156 The relevant government websites as of November 2006 are: 
http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____20266.aspx and 
http://www.parliament.nz/en-
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calculations.  Given past experience, we might expect them to require the incumbent 
landline providers’ share to fall below a particular threshold (say, 50%) before substantial 
deregulation would occur.
158  However, this approach would be incorrect because in a 
high fixed cost business such as telecommunications only a small loss in market share is 
sufficient to constraint a large firm from increasing price above competitive levels.   
  Suppose prices under regulation are set at approximately “competitive levels.”  
Consider the decision of an incumbent to increase prices 5% above the competitive level 
in a given market.
159  Because competition takes place at the margin, only a small 
proportion of the ILEC’s customers need to defect to defeat its attempted price increase. 
In a simple example, it is possible to calculate that necessary proportion. Suppose that an 
ILEC attempted to increase prices on end-user access by 5%. How much traffic would 
that ILEC need to lose before the increase would be unprofitable? The formula to 
calculate that “critical share” is: 
 
(1 – MC/P) Q1 < (1.05 – MC/P) Q2.    (5.1) 
 
An important empirical fact for network elements is that fixed costs are a very large 
component of the overall cost, so that marginal cost is a relatively small component. 
Assume, for example, that the ratio of marginal cost to price, MC/P, is 0.2. Then Q2 
would be 0.94Q1, so that the critical share is 6%. Thus, if the ILEC were to attempt to 
raise its price by 5%, and if, as a result, it were to lose more than 6% of its traffic, the 
attempted price increase would be unprofitable and thus unilaterally rescinded.
160  This 
calculation demonstrates that only quite small competitors’ shares are needed to defeat 
                                                 
158 This approach was used by the FCC in decision to de-regulated prices for AT&T in 
the long distance markets in the 1990s. 
159 A 5% price increase above the competitive level is often used in antitrust analysis.  
Regulation sometimes leads to prices below the competitive level, so this analysis would 
need to be modified in those situations. 
160 For a more extensive discussion of critical share, see J. Hausman et al., “Market 
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supracompetitive pricing by an incumbent.
161  This calculation would imply a minimum 
(in magnitude) own price elasticity of -1.2 which seems quite likely to exist where ILEC 
voice telephony competes with cable-based telephony. Econometric investigation of this 
elasticity will require a few years of data since the competition is quite recent in most 
geographic areas. 
Two further considerations operate in opposite directions.  First, we have assumed 
no price discrimination.  If price discrimination occurs, the calculation of equation of 
(5.1) operates in only narrower markets.  However, although historically price 
discrimination was often required by regulators for monopoly providers, with 
competition it is more difficult to undertake price discrimination profitably, especially in 
a business with large fixed costs and low marginal costs.
162  Further, in the United States 
section 202 of the Communications Act of 1934 forbids price discrimination.
163 So long 
as price discrimination does not occur, our calculation of a share below 10% continues to 
hold.   
This relatively low share will decrease when we further consider the fact that 
many customers buy bundles of services.  If they stop their landline subscription, they are 
very likely to stop subscription for voice mail, broadband Internet, call forwarding, and 
other services provided as bundles.  In this situation the required percentage loss to 
constrain prices can be significantly below 5%.
164  Thus, we conclude in the quite near 
future, or even at present, where the incumbents have lost greater than 5% of their 
landline subscription to cable and wireless competition, regulators could safely decree the 
end of regulation.  Incumbents could then provide new services and compete better again 
the cable networks, which currently exercise market power, without the possibility that 
                                                 
161 We do not consider coordinated interaction among the incumbent and its competitors.  
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162 See J. Hausman, et. al., "Market Definition Under Price Discrimination," Antitrust 
Law Journal, Vol. 64, 1996.  The calculations in the paper demonstrate that the firm 
would have to be able to successfully target customers in approximately 95% of the cases 
to be profitable.  Firms are unlikely to have the requisite information to be correct 95% of 
the time. 
163 47 U.S.C. § 202. 
164 See D. Weisman (2006).   71
they will be required to share their successful new services with competitors at regulatory 
decreed prices.   
Indeed in August 2006 (11 months after the conference at which this paper was 
presented), the California Public Utility Commission (CPUC) decided to de-regulate 
fixed line telecommunications services in California.
165  The CPUC found significant 
competition from cable telephone providers and from VoIP offered over broadband, 
which is available in 100% of the zip codes within California.  The CPUC noted that Cox 
Communications had a 40% penetration of cable telephony in Orange County, a very 
populous county in between Los Angeles and San Diego.  The CPUC determined: “VoIP 
provided by cable telephone companies is a direct substitute for circuit-switched wireline 
service.”    They also recognized the competition that mobile (cellular) networks provide 
to fixed line networks:  “Verizon’s survey data regarding customers who have “cut the 
cord” indicate that many customers consider mobile telephones and landline telephones 
to be close substitutes….Verizon demonstrated that wireless substitution accounts for 
approximately half of ILEC primary residential wireline losses.” Lastly, the CPUC found, 
“Wireless service is a substitute for wireline service.”  In terms of competition, the CPUC 
recognized that competition occurs at the margin (as in our previous calculation) and that 
market shares could not be used to infer market power: “The calculation of HHI values 
provides no information relevant to our assessment of ILEC market power, because 
rapidly changing technological and market conditions undercut our ability to use HHI as 
a measure of market power.”  California has thus decided the correct policy is the “End 
of Regulation” for fixed line telecommunications.  A number of other large states are 
currently holding regulatory proceedings to determine whether they should also end 
regulation of fixed lined telephone service.  Both Illinois and New York state have also 
decided to de-regulate fixed line telephone services.  The Canadian government also 
voted recently to deregulate fixed line telephone services in geographic areas where cable 
TV competition and cellular competition exist.
166 
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A potentially important economic question is whether two competing platforms, 
operated by the ILECs and the cable TV companies, are sufficient to insure a competitive 
outcome.
167  Alternatively, would the two platform operators coordinate their actions to 
maintain high prices?  Our view is that coordination is very unlikely.  The two sets of 
firms begin at opposite ends of the “Hotelling product space” since cable beings with a 
near zero amount of telephone customers and the ILECs begin with a near zero amount of 
pay-TV customers.  Further, given the high fixed costs and relatively low marginal costs 
of new customers (especially for telephone service) the economic incentives to 
coordinate pricing is low and the economic incentives to cheat are high.  More 
importantly, evidence to date demonstrates that the cable companies and ILECs have 
been highly competitive with each other.  Cable companies are now establishing cellular 
service to expand from a “triple play” to the “quadruple play” to allow them to compete 
better with Verizon and AT&T, both of whom are adding pay-TV and will have a 
“quadruple play” since they both own cellular companies.  Thus, we conclude that de-
regulation and competition will likely work well with facilities-based competition, but 
other economists might not agree with this conclusion.  Also, the growing important of 
cellular networks almost makes coordination between telephone platform operators and 
cable platform operators even less likely to occur. 
The alternative to wireline facilities-based competition and deregulation is 
“regulation forever.”  Our reading of the regulatory experience in the United Kingdom 
and New Zealand is that the onset of regulation coincided with the end of competitor-
based expansion of wireline networks.  As we discussed, the cable television networks 
stopped their expansion in the United Kingdom and Telstra-Clear stopped its network 
expansion in New Zealand.   Similar experiences occurred in other countries such as 
Australia.  Although we can advance other reasons for this observed end to geographic 
expansion, a leading cause would seem to be that competitors need not make significant 
sunk investments in regulatory access to incumbents networks.  Instead, they acquire 
access at below competitive prices without the risk of sunk network investments.  We 
                                                 
167 To the extent that other technologies such as cellular and WiMax increase in 
competitive importance this potential concern would not be important.   73
find it interesting that the US and Canada will now have deregulation while the UK, 
Australia, and New Zealand are heading toward “regulation forever.”
168 
Without facilities-based competition, the regulator will be in charge of the future 
direction of telecommunications in these countries.  Indeed, this future role for regulators 
seems to have been made explicit in the proposed restructuring of BT, since Ofcom 
would assume corporate governance of BT’s access network, even though ownership 
(and, hence, financial risk) would remain with private shareholders. Similarly, in 
Australia where the government sold off its controlling (51%) interest in the incumbent 
ILEC Telstra in November 2006, it could have divested the fiber optic cable network that 
Telstra operates in the large cities in Australia.  Facilities-based competition might then 
have replaced the mandatory local unbundling regulatory framework used by the ACCC, 
which has been the topic of intense controversy between Telstra and the ACCC.  
However, Telstra was divested with its control of both the copper loop network and the 
largest fiber-based cable network intact so that the prospect for facilities-based 
competition in Australia has decreased.
169  
Experience has demonstrated that markets do considerably better than regulators 
in creating consumers welfare gains.  Although international benchmark comparisons 
will provide some useful information, the natural regulatory tendency towards a 
competitor welfare standard rather than a consumer welfare standard will continue to 
create problems.  Thus, our two closing comments are that regulation might be improved 
if regulators adopt an explicit consumer welfare goal, as in New Zealand and Australia, 
and that a viable regulatory plan is adopted where the end point is facilities-based 
competition and deregulation.  The technology and economics exist for such an end point 
as recent action in the US have demonstrated. The regulatory framework in a given 
country will determine the speed at which this end point of the “End of Regulation” is 
approached. 
                                                 
168 We apologize for our English language bias in country selection.  However, the EU is 
also headed towards “regulation forever.”  
169 A group of CLECs in Australia has proposed to build its own fiber-based network, 
which could lead to facilities based competition.  However, the economic feasibility of 
such a network investment has not yet been demonstrated and no current plans exist to 
begin construction of the network. Figure 1 
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